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BARTLETT REVISITED: THE IMPACT OF SEVERAL
LIABILITY ON PRETRIAL PROCEDURE IN NEW
MEXICO-PART TWO*
M.E. OCCHIALINO**

I. INTRODUCTION
The New Mexico Supreme Court knew that the adoption of comparative negligence and several liability would require significant adjustments to the rules of civil
procedure in order to accommodate the changes in the substantive law. The court's
decision substituting comparative negligence for contributory negligence noted that
opponents of the change "assert that existing statutes, doctrines, and uniform jury
instructions will be subject to confusion, uncertainty, and revision if we adopt
comparative negligence." ' The court accepted this as inevitable, signaled that it
might have to make changes in court rules or jury instructions,2 and declared its
"great faith in the ability of our state's trial judges to sort out any problems that may
arise."3 Soon after New Mexico replaced joint and several liability with several
liability based on comparative fault,4 the court again acknowledged that "the rules
must be adjusted and made suitable to fit the changes in the substantive law."5
The adjustment process has been ongoing for more than twenty years. The
supreme court has drafted new uniform jury instructions to reflect the proper
interaction of several liability and civil procedure6 but has not rewritten any civil
procedure rules in response to the changes in substantive law. Instead, New Mexico
courts have confronted the resulting procedural issues on an ad-hoc basis in the
ordinary course of litigation. A series of cases has reconstrued rules of civil
procedure to authorize changes required by the adoption of several liability. This
common law process is slower than the wholesale modification of procedure rules,
but the courts benefit from concrete problems in the natural setting of actual
litigation.7 Many procedural problems have been addressed and resolved; some have
* This article is the second part in a series by the author addressing the fact that New Mexico has largely
abandoned the doctrine ofjoint and several liability for torts in favor of liability based on comparative fault. In part
one, the author explored the substantive scope and limits of the several liability doctrine. M.E. Occhialino, Bartlett
Revisited: New Mexico Tort Law Twenty Years After the Abolition of Joint and Several Liability-PartOne, 33
N.M. L. REv. 1(2003). This second article explores the impact of several liability on the procedural rules governing
the pretrial phase of litigation and on the trial strategies of litigants. A third article will investigate the impact that
the adoption of several liability has had on trial and appellate procedure and practice in New Mexico.
** Lee and Leon Karelitz Chair in Evidence and Procedure, University of New Mexico School ofLaw. The
School of Law and the author are grateful for the generous support of Judge Karelitz to the educational mission of
the School of Law. The author also acknowledges the outstanding research assistance of Ms. Jaime Dawes, a recent
graduate of the University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 687, 634 P.2d 1234, 1239 (1981).
2. Id. at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240.
3. Id.
4. See Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152,646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982); NMSA 1978,
§ 41-3A-1 (1987) (legislative confirmation of several liability doctrine).
5. Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689, 693, 712 P.2d 1351, 1355 (1985).
6. E.g., UJI 13-302C NMRA (statement of denial and affirmative defenses); UJI 13-2219 NMRA
(comparative negligence, comparison among defendants ornon-parties, and general verdict); UJI 13-2220 NMRA
(comparative negligence and special verdict).
7. "The law.. upon every subject, has been greatly modified or extended and improved.. .by the gradual
process ofjudicial decision, and it is one of the greatest virtues of the common law that it can be so molded to meet
the needs of social development." Borrego v. Territory, 8 N.M. 446,493,46 P. 349, 362 (N.M. 1896) (per curiam),
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been considered but not finally determined. Still others have not yet arisen in
reported cases but inevitably will in the future.
As the courts seek to strike a just balance between substance and procedure,
litigants seek to gain procedural advantages from the developing law. Problems and
opportunities abound for both plaintiffs and defendants. In the pretrial phase of
several liability litigation, plaintiffs must consider the impact of several liability on
the decision of how many tortfeasors to sue, and how to plead the fault of many
persons without having defendants use those pleadings as admissions that benefit
a defendant's attempt to lay off fault on third parties. 8 Plaintiffs also must anticipate
that defendants may seek to lay off fault on tortfeasors initially unknown to the
plaintiff and must have a strategy for identifying and suing the additional tortfeasors
before the applicable statute of limitations has run.9
Defendants must decide which of the three available alternatives offers the best
means to raise the defense of the fault of others, weighing the tactical benefits and
detriments of each.' ° Because defendants bear the burden of proving the fault of
others" and plaintiffs often oppose their attempts to do so, defendants also must be
prepared for the possibility that plaintiffs or other defendants might seek summary
judgments of non-liability of other defendants, leaving one defendant as the sole
wrongdoer, fully liable to the plaintiff. Defendants sometimes must decide whether
to defend at all, and all parties must consider the problems that arise when a
defendant defaults rather than defending against a claim of liability."2
The process of fully integrating procedural jurisprudence with the substantive
doctrine of several liability is not complete. There is, however, a sufficient body of
case law to permit an initial assessment ofjudicial attempts to adjust the procedural
rules to accommodate the changed substantive law and to identify issues that have
yet to be addressed.
H1. PLEADING: PLAINTIFF'S PERSPECTIVE
A. The Need to Identify All Tortfeasors
The adoption of several liability 3 complicates the plaintiffs pre-litigation
planning. When joint and several liability applied, the plaintiff could obtain full
recovery by suing only one of several possible tortfeasors if that tortfeasor were

affd sub nom. Borrego v. Cunningham, 164 U.S. 612 (1896), overruled in part on other grounds by Territory v.
McGinnis, 10 N.M. 269, 61 P. 208 (1900).
8. See infra notes 13-23, 48-71 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 24-47 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 195-283 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 24.
12. See infra notes 76-194 and accompanying text.
13. See NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-I(B) (1987).
In causes of action to which several liability applies, any defendant who establishes that the fault
of another is a proximate cause of a plaintiffs injury shall be liable only for that portion of the
total dollar amount awarded as damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of such
defendant's fault to the total fault attributed to all persons, including plaintiffs, defendants, and
persons not party to the action.
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provably liable and had sufficient assets to pay the judgment.' 4 The task of
identifying and suing other tortfeasors fell upon the targeted defendant who might
seek contribution 5 or indemnity 6 from them if held liable for all the plaintiffs
injuries.
Several liability requires that the plaintiff engage in a different strategy: to obtain
full recovery, the plaintiff now must sue each tortfeasor. The plaintiff must try to
identify all tortfeasors before filing the lawsuit and must determine if one or more
of them are jointly and severally liable for all of the plaintiff s injuries pursuant to
the exceptions to the general rule of several liability. 7 If no tortfeasor is jointly and
severally liable, the plaintiff usually should sue each identified tortfeasor to assure
full recovery. Sometimes, however, a plaintiff may choose not to sue a known
potential tortfeasor who would be severally liable. A plaintiff might forego a claim
against a potential tortfeasor whose liability is doubtful, whose percentage of fault
is likely to be very low, or who lacks assets to pay its percentage of the total
damages. 8
A plaintiff who identifies and plans to sue numerous severally-liable tortfeasors
must decide whether to join them in a single lawsuit or sue them in separate
actions.' 9 Joining all in a single lawsuit is the norm.2° Where, however, a tortfeasor
is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the plaintiffs chosen forum or would
destroy subject matter jurisdiction in a federal diversity action, the plaintiff might
choose to file separate actions against some tortfeasors. A plaintiff also might
forego joining multiple tortfeasors as co-defendants if their presence would create
procedural problems more daunting than the gains to be realized from joining
them. 2' The decision whether to join defendants or sue them separately can be
influenced by tactical disadvantages to a plaintiff that flow from the doctrine of
collateral estoppel if the plaintiff sues multiple tortfeasors separately. For example,
in subsequent litigation, the plaintiff may be bound by an earlier defeat but will not
be able to use a victory in the first lawsuit to preclude relitigation of common issues
in the subsequent litigation.22 Moreover, when separate actions are a sound tactical
14. "'[J]oint and several liability'... mean[s] that either of two persons whose concurrent negligence
contributed to cause plaintiffs' injury and damage may be held liable for the entire amount of the damage caused
by them." Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 154, 646 P.2d 579, 581 (Ct. App. 1982).
15. See NMSA 1978, §§ 41-3-1 to 41-3-8 (1987).
16. See, e.g., Rio Grande Gas Co. v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 80 N.M. 432, 457 P.2d 364 (1969).
17. See NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-1(C) (1987); see also Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422,
902 P.2d 1025 (1995) (successive tortfeasors).
18. A plaintiff may be obligated to identify in the complaint persons who are potential tortfeasors but have
not been joined and to state the reasons for not joining them. See Rule 1-019(C) NMRA; infra notes 243-283 and
accompanying text.
19. See Rule 1-020(A) NMRA (providing that plaintiff "may" join multiple defendants severally liable if
there is a common question of law or fact and the claims arise from the same occurrence or series of occurrences).
20. See Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689, 693, 712 P.2d 1351, 1355 (1985) (emphasizing that all
known tortfeasors who can be joined should be made parties).
21. For example, multiple defendants in several liability cases may be entitled to separate peremptory
challenges during jury selection, Sewell v. Wilson, 101 N.M. 486, 492-93, 684 P.2d 1151, 1157-58 (Ct. App.
1984), while a single plaintiff is limited in the number of challenges it may exercise. See Rule 1-038(E) NMRA;
Gallegos v. Citizens Ins. Agency, 108 N.M. 722, 734, 779 P.2d 99, 111 (1989) (listing considerations). Multiple
defendants may also be able to each exercise one peremptory challenge to the trial judge while a single plaintiff
only gets one such challenge. See Rule 1-088.1(A)-(B) NMRA; NMSA 1978, § 38-3-9 (1985).
22. See M.E. Occhialino, The Impact of Non-Mutual CollateralEstoppel on Tort Litigation Involving
Several Liability, 18 N.M. L. REV. 559, 561-67 (1988).
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choice for the plaintiff, defendants sued separately may use procedural devices to
gather the separate cases into a single action."
B. The Statute of Limitations Problem
A critical factor in the plaintiff s planning is the applicable statute of limitations.
If the plaintiff files the lawsuit shortly before the statute of limitations will run, the
plaintiffs failure to identify and sue all possible defendants can have disastrous
consequences. The defendant might raise the affirmative defense24 of the "fault of
others" without naming the other tortfeasors in the answer.25 The plaintiff then must
engage in discovery to learn the identity of the additional alleged tortfeasors and
decide whether to join them in the action. If the statute of limitations runs before the
plaintiff learns the identity of
the additional tortfeasors, the plaintiff may be unable
26
to join them in the lawsuit.

Some states provide a remedy by rule or statute for plaintiffs who discover the
identity of additional tortfeasors after the applicable limitations period passes.
Alaska's third-party practice rule provides that, in a several liability case, the
plaintiff can recover a judgment against a third-party defendant even if the plaintiff
has not amended the complaint to seek affirmative relief from the third-party
defendant.27 In Alaska GeneralAlarm, Inc. v. Grinnell,28 the Alaska Supreme Court
construed the rule to allow recovery by the plaintiff against the third-party
defendant even though the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff's claim
when the defendant filed the third-party complaint.29 Hawaii provides by statute that
for thirty days after a defendant impleads a third-party defendant, the plaintiff may
amend the complaint to assert a claim against the third-party defendant if an action
against the third-party defendant would have been timely had the plaintiff initially
joined it as a co-defendant in the action.3" In Tennessee, the plaintiff may amend the
23. See, e.g., Rule 1-042(A) NMRA (consolidation); Rule 1-019 NMRA (necessary and indispensable
parties); Rule 1-014 NMRA (third-party practice); see also, e.g., Tipton, 103 N.M. at 693, 712 P.2d at 1355.
24. The fault of others is an affirmative defense. See UJI 13-302C NMRA; NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-l(B)
(1987) (providing that defendant must establish the fault of others to be eligible for apportionment).
25. The plaintiff must also-anticipate that a potential tortfeasor that the plaintiff knew of but chose not to
sue for tactical reasons might nonetheless be the subject of a defendant's affirmative defense. When this occurs,
the plaintiff must reconsider the initial decision not to sue that person and may choose to add the person as a
defendant.
26. It is not clear whether a defendant can lay off fault on a tortfeasor who was not sued by the plaintiff or
brought into the lawsuit by the defendant until after the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff's claim against
the tortfeasor. The several liability statute provides only that a defendant "who establishes that the fault of another
is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury" may lay off fault on that person. NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-I (B) (1987).
There is no suggestion in the statute that the existence of an affirmative defense such as the statute of limitations
would bar the defendant from laying off fault on a tortfeasor who is a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILTY § B 19 cmt. e (2000) (stating that tortfeasors with
statute of limitations defense should be assigned percentage of fault). In an analogous situation, New Mexico
permits a defendant to lay off fault on a tortfeasor even though that tortfeasor is immune from suit by the plaintiff.
See St. Sauver v. N.M. Peterbilt, Inc., 101 N.M. 84,678 P.2d 712 (Ct. App. 1984) (enrolled tribal member); Collins
ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40 (1991) (quasi-judicial immunity); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OFTORTS: APPORTIONMENTOF LIABIITY § B 19 cmt. e (2000) (indicating that defendant may lay off fault
on tortfeasors who are immune from liability).
27. ALA. R. Civ. P. 14(b).
28. 1 P.3d 98 (Ala. 2000).
29. Id. at 103.
30. HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 657-7.5 (Michie 2003).
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complaint within ninety days of service of the defendant's answer to add as a
defendant any alleged tortfeasor named in the defendant's answer even if the statute
of limitations has run on the claim.3 In several liability actions in Iowa, the filing
of a complaint against any one wrongdoer "tolls the statute of limitations for the
commencement
of an action against all parties who may be assessed any percentage
32
of fault.
New Mexico has no equivalent statute protecting plaintiffs from the statute of
limitations defense when the named defendant identifies additional alleged
tortfeasors after the statute of limitations has run on the plaintiff s claims against
them. The obvious solution is for the plaintiff to sue the target defendants long
before the applicable statute of limitations runs, so that there is ample time to
conduct discovery and identify additional tortfeasors who should be joined as
defendants. This option, however, is not always available to counsel who are
retained shortly before the limitations period runs.
An inappropriate alternative solution would be for the plaintiff to sue everyone
who could conceivably be at fault. This approach is inadequate for two reasons.
First, the plaintiff may still fail to include all actual tortfeasors because the
defendant may have exclusive access to information that would identify them.
Second, this solution could constitute a violation of Rule 1-011, which requires that
attorneys sign all pleadings, thus signifying "that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support" the pleading.3 3
Rule 1-011 seeks to prevent deliberate advancement of unfounded claims or
defenses. 34 Although the rule imposes only a subjective good faith standard upon
the signer,35 an attorney who helps a plaintiff to sue defendants without any ground
for doing so other than to assure that every potential tortfeasor is named as a
defendant would violate Rule 1-011.36
Federal Rule 11 is more stringent than the New Mexico rule. The attorney's
signature on the complaint certifies "that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances... the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support

31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1-119 (2004). The statute provides the plaintiff the option to file a new lawsuit
against the named person instead of joining that person in the pending action. Id. § 20-1-119(a)(2). "The statute
is intended to provide an injured party with a fair opportunity to bring before the court all persons who caused or
contributed to the party's injuries." Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co., 50 S.W.3d 446, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
32. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.8 (2003).
33. Rule 1-011 NMRA.
34. Rivera v. Brazos Lodge, Inc., 111 N.M. 670,674,808 P.2d 955,959 (1991); see also Air Ruidoso, Ltd.
v. Executive Aviation Ctr., Inc., 122 N.M. 71, 77, 920 P.2d 1025, 1031 (1996); Lowe v. Bloom, 112 N.M. 203,
204, 813 P.2d 480, 481 (1991).
35. Rivera, 111 N.M. at 675, 808 P.2d at 960.
36. The subjective standard would not allow a party to "pursue a claim on nothing more than the
unreasonable hope that he may discover a basis for the lawsuit." Id. at 680,808 P.2d at 965 (quoting Gilbert v. Bd.
of Med. Examiners, 745 P.2d 617,629 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)). To do so would be evidence of subjective bad faith.
Id. (citing Gilbert, 745 P.2d at 629).
In Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln FederalSavings &Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (decided
under an earlier, more stringent version of Rule I1 under which the signer had to certify that there was good ground
to support the claim), the court stated that "[i]t is an abuse of process to use the issuance of a complaint to discover
which of a number of parties is the proper party to be sued," id. at 983, and explicitly disapproved of randomly
filing suit as an alternative to conducting an investigation to determine the proper parties.
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or... are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery."37 Faced with an impending statute of limitations
problem, an attorney might be able to avoid Rule 11 sanctions for suing a defendant
whose liability is questionable, as long as there is some basis for bringing a claim
against that defendant, 38 due to the rule's emphasis on reasonableness "under the
circumstances."3 9 Furthermore, the federal rule's safe harbor provision' decreases
the likelihood4 that a sanction will be imposed on a plaintiff's attorney faced with
the impending expiration of the statute of limitations through no fault of the
attorney.
A lawyer who must file suit close to the running of the statute of limitations
needs an alternative that will allow joinder of all responsible parties and is not
dependent on counsel's ability to hastily ascertain their identity. 2 A New Mexico
statute adopted in 1897"3 provides that if a plaintiff does not know the identity of
a defendant, the plaintiff may identify the person in the complaint by any name "and
when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding may be amended
accordingly."" This statute, authorizing "John Doe" defendants, is no panacea for
plaintiffs, however. Despite the language broadly authorizing amendment of the
pleading upon learning the identity of the defendant, New Mexico courts hold that
amendments to "John Doe" pleadings are effective only when the provisions of
Rule 1-015 dealing with relation back of amendments are met.4 5 The plaintiff who
wants to substitute a newly-identified tortfeasor for "John Doe" after the statute of
limitations has run must demonstrate that (1) prior to the time for service of process
upon a defendant after filing a timely action,46 the alleged tortfeasor had such notice

37. FED. R. Cv.P. 11(b).
38. A plaintiff can make allegations for which there is no current evidentiary support if the attorney
specifically identifies such allegations and maintains that they "are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation." FED. R. Civ. P. I I(b)(3).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
40. Before a party can obtain sanctions for violation of Rule 11, the party must give the other side twentyone days to withdraw or modify the challenged pleading. FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(c)(l)(A).
41. When the sanction request comes from a party, the twenty-one-day "safe harbor" provision appears to
be mandatory. The court, however, may itself institute a show-cause proceeding to sanction a party for violation
of Rule 11, because the "safe harbor" provision is not applicable to court-instituted sanction proceedings. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 1l(c)(1)(B).
42. Though New Mexico sometimes applies a "discovery rule" that provides that the statue of limitations
does not begin to run until certain facts are known to the plaintiff, e.g., Martinez v. Showa Denko, K.K., 1998NMCA-I 11, 1 19, 964 P.2d 176, 181, New Mexico has not extended the discovery rule to situations where it is
the identity of the tortfeasor rather than the existence of the injury that is the undiscovered fact. Apparently a
majority of courts that have considered the matter have ruled that the discovery rule, when applicable, delays the
date of accrual of the statute of limitations until the identity of the defendant is knowable. See, e.g., Tarnowsky v.
Socci, 856 A.2d 408, 411-13 (Conn. 2004) (surveying state law and extending discovery rule to include identity
of defendant). But see Jackson v. Viii. of Rosemont, 536 N.E.2d 720, 722 (111.App. Ct. 1988) ("[C]ourts have
refused to extend the discovery rule to apply to cases where the undetermined fact is not the existence of the injury,
but rather the identity of the tortfeasor.").
43. Act of March 18, 1897, ch. 73, § 84, 1897 N.M. Territory Acts, 175.
44. NMSA 1978, § 38-2-6 (1953).
45. Macias v. Jaramillo, 2000-NMCA-086, 25, 11 P.3d 153, 158.
46. The notice must be received "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against
him." Rule 1-015(C) NMRA. Literally, this would require that the defendant to be substituted or added must have
received notice prior to the date the statute of limitations expired. In Galion v. Conmaco International,Inc., 99
N.M. 403,658 P.2d 1130 (1983), however, the court construed the language liberally so "that the period in which
notice must be received includes the reasonable time allowed under the rules of civil procedure for service of
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of the lawsuit that prejudice in defending the action will not result if the amendment
is allowed, and (2) the alleged tortfeasor knew or should have known that but for
a mistake in identification, the plaintiff would have brought the action against him
or her.47
Plaintiffs who do not wish to rely upon the vagaries of Rule 1-015(C) should
avoid being in the position of learning of additional tortfeasors after the statute of
limitations has run. This can best be accomplished by conducting thorough factual
investigation prior to commencing the action and by filing the lawsuit well before
the statute of limitations has run. The plaintiff can then conduct discovery of the
defendant who asserts the generic defense of the "fault of others" and can add the
newly discovered wrongdoers as parties before the statute of limitations runs.
C. Drafting the Complaint
The intricacies of several liability create complications for attorneys when
drafting complaints. Plaintiffs must be careful to avoid inadvertent admissions
against interest in their pleadings.4" Whether a plaintiff sues one defendant or many,
a defendant might seek to use the plaintiff's pleadings as an admission that supports
that defendant's affirmative defense of the fault of others. The decision to sue a
single defendant may be premised on the belief that the defendant is the only
tortfeasor.49 If so, the complaint will assert that the chosen defendant is liable for
all of the plaintiff's injuries. If the defendant's answer identifies another possible
tortfeasor when pleading the Bartlettdefense, the plaintiff may decide to amend the
complaint to add the additional tortfeasor as a defendant.5" The amended pleading

process." Id. at 405, 658 P.2d at 1132. So long as the complaint is filed within the statute of limitations, the
plaintiff may serve process thereafter within a reasonable time without running afoul of the statute of limitations.
See Prieto v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, 94 N.M. 738, 742,616 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Ct. App. 1980); Romero
v. Bachicha, 2001-NMCA-048, I 16-17, 28 P.3d 1151, 1156.
47. Rule 1-015(C)(l)-(2) NMRA. A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the claim in the amended
complaint arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as was set forth in the original pleading, id., a
requirement that should not pose a problem in most several liability cases. See Heffem v. First Interstate Bank, 99
N.M. 531,534,660 P.2d 621,624 (Ct. App. 1983) (adopting the "logical relationship test" for determining whether
the same transaction or occurrence test is met for purpose of determining whether counterclaims are compulsory
under Rule 1-013(A)).
48. Rule 11-804(D)(2)(d) NMRA.
A pleading prepared by an attorney is an admission by one presumptively authorized to speak
for his principal... When a pleading is amended or withdrawn, the superseded portion ceases
to be a conclusive judicial admission; but it still remains as a statement once seriously made by
an authorized agent, and as such it is competent evidence of the facts stated, though
controvertible, like any other extra-judicial admission made by a party or his agent....If the agent
made the admission without adequate information, that goes to its weight, not to its
admissibility.
United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Kunglig Jamvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter &
Carpenter, Inc., 32 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1929)); see also United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir.
1991); Rule 11-804(B)(3) NMRA.
49. Alternatively, the plaintiff may forego suing others because the plaintiff concludes that the targeted
defendant is jointly and severally liable, see NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-1(C) (2004), and has sufficient resources to
fully compensate the plaintiff.
50. If the plaintiff instead sues the additional defendant in a separate suit, the problem of inadvertent
admissions still exists because pleadings in one case can be used as admissions in other cases. See, e.g., Albright
v. Albright, 21 N.M. 606,623-24, 157 P. 662,667 (1916); Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d
707, 719-20 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); DeChristofaro v. Machala, 685 A.2d 258, 265-66 (R.I. 1996).
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will allege that the added defendant is a tortfeasor and is wholly or partially liable
for the plaintiff's injuries. The new defendant will seek to use the original pleading,
which asserted that the initial defendant was the sole proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries, as an admission that the new defendant is not liable.
A plaintiff who sues multiple defendants faces a similar pleading problem.
Because one defendant may be exonerated, the plaintiff will allege that each
defendant is fully liable to the plaintiff and will allege, alternatively, that each is a
tortfeasor severally liable for a portion of the plaintiff's injuries. Each defendant
will assert that the plaintiff s allegation that the other was negligent is an admission
that supports the defendant's Bartlettdefense laying off fault on the other.
The plaintiffs dilemma is not only theoretical. In Dreierv. Upjohn Co.,5' a case
decided prior to Connecticut's adoption of several liability, the plaintiff initially
joined the prescribing doctor and the drug manufacturer in an action, alleging each
was liable for injurious side effects of a drug.52 The plaintiff decided to drop the
lawsuit against the manufacturer and filed an amended complaint leaving only the
doctor as a defendant.53 The trial court permitted the doctor to introduce the initial
complaint, containing plaintiff s assertion that the drug company was at fault, as an
admission tending to exonerate the doctor.54 The Supreme Court of Connecticut
affirmed the use of the superseded pleading as an admission.55 The court rejected
the plaintiffs argument that liberal pleading rules allowing alternative pleadings
precluded a finding that the plaintiffs allegation of the drug company's liability
constituted an admission against interest: "While alternative and inconsistent
pleading is permitted, it would be an abuse of such permission for a plaintiff to
make an assertion in a complaint that he does not reasonably believe to be the
truth. 56 The fact that the plaintiff drafted the complaint before it was possible to
conduct discovery and while the facts were still uncertain did not preclude use of
the pleading as an admission, though these circumstances could be relevant to the
issue of the weight given to the admission and could be explained to the jury.57
Dreier's treatment of alternative allegations in superseded pleadings as
admissions has not been affected by Connecticut's subsequent adoption of several
liability. In Danko v. Redway Enterprises,Inc.,58 the defendant sought to reduce its
liability by asserting in a pleading that, if the defendant was at fault, another entity's
fault combined with the fault of the defendant to cause the plaintiff s injury.59 The
Connecticut Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could introduce the pleading at
trial as an admission despite its hypothetical nature.6' Though Danko involved the

51. 492 A.2d 164 (Conn. 1985).
52. Id. at 166.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 169.
56. Id. at 167. In contrast to the Connecticut rule, which forbids allegations made "without reasonable
cause," CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-99 (West 1991), New Mexico requires only that the pleader have a subjective
belief that there is ground to support the pleading. Rule 1-011 NMRA; Rivera, 111 N.M. at 674, 808 P.2d at 959.
57. Dreier,492 A.2d at 168; see id. at 168 n.1 ("[T]he impeached party must be given an opportunity to
explain the admissions in the superceded pleading.").
58. 757 A.2d 1064 (Conn. 2000).
59. Id. at 1066.
60. Id. at 1071.
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use of the defendant's pleading by the plaintiff, the court reaffirmed that the
plaintiff who permissibly pleads alternatively and inconsistently in multiple
tortfeasor cases cannot avoid having the pleadings deemed admissions even though
"one or more of the plaintiff's claims fairly may be described as contingent on the
discovery of... additional facts."61
New Mexico should not follow the Connecticut approach.62 Before discovery is
complete, both the plaintiff and defendant must plead based on imperfect
knowledge against a background of substantive law that compels alternative and
possibly inconsistent pleading. New Mexico's rules of procedure permit such
pleading, 63 command that pleadings be construed to do substantial justice, 6' and
aspire to fosterjust determinations. 65 The New Mexico Supreme Court has already
recognized that "admissions... unavoidably contained in one defense cannot be used
against a defendant in another. To hold otherwise, would greatly impair, if not
totally destroy, the right to plead inconsistent defenses" provided by Rule 1008(E).66 The same rule should apply to the initial pleadings of all parties in several
liability cases. Penalizing parties for properly pleading alternative scenarios when
operating under imperfect knowledge undercuts the goals of the procedural rules.
Instead, the trial court should enter a scheduling order setting an appropriate time
for completing discovery and amending pleadings. 67 Thereafter, at a pretrial
conference, the trial court can require the parties to amend pleadings to add and
drop allegations concerning the fault of the parties and other tortfeasors. 6' At the
end of this process, the contents of the pleadings can and should serve as admissions
to the extent authorized by law.69
There is a solution to the problem of statements in initial pleadings being used
against plaintiffs. If statements in a pleading are equivocal, they do not constitute
an admission.7 ° To protect against the possibility of inadvertent admissions, plaintiffs who lack full knowledge of the facts should qualify statements in pleadings that
assert that other parties are wholly or partially at fault. Borrowing language from

61. Id.
62. Not all courts agree that alternative pleadings are admissions. A leading treatise and some cases take
the position that early pleadings, especially those written before discovery occurs, should not be treated as
admissions as a matter of course. E.g., Pierce v. Cen. Me. Power Co., 622 A.2d 80 (Me. 1993); Curtis v. Canyon
Highway Dist. No. 4, 831 P.2d 541 (Idaho 1992); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 257 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999).
63. Rule 1-008(E)(2) NMRA.
64. Rule 1-008(F) NMRA.
65. Rule 1-001 NMRA.
66. McMurdo v. S. Union Gas Co., 56 N.M. 672, 675, 248 P.2d 668, 670 (1952).
67. See Rule 1-016(B) NMRA.
68. See Rule 1-016(A) NMRA; Rule 1-016(C)(l)-(3) NMRA.
69. Some courts hold that admissions in pleadings are not only admissible but also constitute "judicial
admissions" that are binding on the party making the admission. E.g., Brooks v. Ctr. for Healthcare Servs., 981
S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that statements of fact not pled in the alternative, in "live," not
superseded pleadings, are conclusive); Anderson v. Cumpston, 606 N.W.2d 817, 823 (Neb. 2000). New Mexico
does not give conclusive effect to admissions in live pleadings. See S. Union Exploration Co. v. Wynn Exploration
Co., 95 N.M. 594, 624 P.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding that admission in pleadings is one factor to be considered
with other evidence but is "by no means conclusive").
70. E.g., John B. Conomos, Inc. v. Sun Co., 831 A.2d 696, 713 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) ("The fact must have
been unequivocally admitted and not be merely one interpretation of the statement that is purported to be ajudicial
admission.").
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Federal Rule 11, the plaintiff might state that the allegations and factual contentions
are based only on information and belief and "are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."7

M. PLEADING: DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE
Like any defendant, the defendant in a several liability case has the option of
defaulting or responding to the complaint. Default judgment practice has been
significantly affected by the adoption of several liability in ways that benefit the
defaulting defendant at the expense of the plaintiff and non-defaulting defendants.
72
To compensate for these changes, non-defaulting parties must adjust their tactics
and the judiciary will have to make additional modifications to default judgment
practice to ensure fairness to all parties.73
The defendant who does not default must determine how to raise the issue of the
fault of others. The New Mexico Supreme Court has provided a variety of ways in
which the defendant may do so.74 Differing tactical benefits to defendants that flow
from the choice may be inconsistent with the goals of the several liability doctrine.75
Thus, the courts need to evaluate current practice and decide whether one of the
existing options is superior and should be adopted as the sole method.
A. Default Judgment
When joint and several liability applied, the defaulting defendant conceded
liability but not the amount of unliquidated damages.76 Before entering a default
judgment, the court would hold a hearing to determine the unliquidated damages.77
If the defaulting defendant appeared at the damages hearing, the defaulter could
cross-examine the plaintiffs witnesses and could also present witnesses dealing
with the proper amount of damages,7" though not with liability issues.79
Comparative negligence and several liability seek to assure that no defendant
pays more than its fair share based upon its percentage of fault."0 If the defaulting
defendant were not allowed to demonstrate that the plaintiff and other tortfeasors
were partially to blame, full liability would be assessed to the defaulter, who might
actually be responsible for only a portion of the plaintiffs injuries. The central
premise of several liability would be sacrificed in order to sanction the defendant
for its default.
New Mexico initially determined that sanctioning the defaulting defendant was
a greater priority than assuring that the defaulter paid only its share of the total

71. FED. R. Clv.P. l(b)(3).
72. See infra notes 137-178 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 137-178 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 167-178 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 167-178 and accompanying text.
76. Gallegos v. Franklin, 89 N.M. 118, 125, 547 P.2d 1160, 1167 (Ct. App. 1976).
77. Id. at 123, 547 P.2d at 1165.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 125, 547 P.2d at 1165.
80. "[Tlhe law of comparative negligence in New Mexico requires that the trier of fact determine negligence
proportionately, and holds that a tortfeasor be held liable for damages only to the extent of his percentage of
negligence." St. Sauver v. N.M. Peterbilt, Inc., 101 N.M. 84, 87, 678 P.2d 712, 715 (Ct. App. 1984).
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damages. In Passinov. Cascade Steel Fabricators,Inc.,8 l the court of appeals ruled
that the defaulting defendant could not reduce its liability by seeking to prove at the
damages hearing that plaintiff or others were partially at fault.8 2 The court reasoned
that to allow the defaulter to do so "would seriously weaken, and could even abolish
the efficacy of default judgments." 3 Instead, the defaulting defendant was fully
liable for the plaintiff's injuries and, as in the past, could only dispute the scope and
value of the plaintiff's unliquidated damages.8 4
Ten years later, the Supreme Court of New Mexico reached the opposite
conclusion. In Burge v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.,8 5 a divided court overruled
Passinoand held that the adoption of comparative negligence and several liability
required a change in default judgment law. 6 In comparative fault cases, the court
held, "a defaulting party admits only to the liability aspect of the complaint, thus
reserving for the damages hearing a determination of damages in accordance with
8
the application of comparative negligence and apportionment of damages." " This
shift in defaultjudgment practice in several liability cases requires reconsideration
of the procedure by which courts enter default judgments. The new procedures will
differ depending on whether the defaulting party is the only defendant or there are
multiple defendants, not all of whom default.
1. Default Judgment Practice: In General
Some aspects of former New Mexico default judgment practice are unaffected
by the adoption of comparative negligence and several liability. When a plaintiff
sues a single defendant who fails to plead or otherwise defend, 8 the plaintiff

81. 105 N.M. 457, 734 P.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1986), overruledby Burge v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 1997NMSC-009, 933 P.2d 210.
82. Id. at 459, 734 P.2d at 237.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 1997-NMSC-009, 933 P.2d 210.
86. "[T]he general rule on default judgments.. must be adapted to apply the doctrine of comparative
negligence." Burge, 1997-NMSC-009, 24, 933 P.2d at 217.
87. Id. 22, 933 P.2d at 217.
88. Rule 1-055 is not limited to situations where the defendant fails to answer or otherwise initiate a
defense, as by filing a Rule 1-012 motion. In Kutz v. Independent Publishing Co., 101 N.M. 587, 686 P.2d 277
(Ct. App. 1984), the defendants entered an appearance and filed answers but, thereafter, failed to attend a pretrial
conference or to comply with a court order concerning the hiring of substitute counsel. Id. at 588, 686 P.2d at 278.
The court entered a default judgment pursuant to Rule 1-055: "The failure to attend the pretrial conference and the
failure to obtain counsel as ordered by the court were failures to 'otherwise defend."' Id. at 589, 686 P.2d at 279;
see also Chase v. Contractors' Equip. & Supply Co., 100 N.M. 39,42, 665 P.2d 301, 304 (Ct. App. 1983) ("Even
though defendant had entered an appearance and filed pleadings, defendant could be in default for failure to
'otherwise defend....'"); Schmider v. Sapir, 82 N.M. 355, 357, 482 P.2d 58, 60 (1971) (stating that a party may
suffer a default judgment for "failure to appear at the trial or some other failure 'to take some step required by some
rule of practice or some rule of court' [or if] 'either of the parties omits or refuses to pursue, in the regular method,
the ordinary measures of prosecution or defense"') (citations omitted).
In contrast, in Rancher's Exploration & Development Co. v. Benedict, 63 N.M. 163, 315 P.2d 228
(1957), when the defendant failed to appear at the trial, the court heard evidence from the plaintiff and then entered
judgment for plaintiff. Id. at 166, 315 P.2d at 229-30. The supreme court ruled that a judgment entered as a result
of the failure to appear in court at the time of trial "was not in a strict sense a judgment by default within the
meaning of Rule 55(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure but rather a final judgment on the merits, after the
introduction of evidence to sustain [plaintiffs] pleadings." Id. at 167, 315 P.2d at 231.
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obtains from the clerk an "entry of default."89 The plaintiff then requests that the
court enter a judgment of default. 90 If counsel for the defendant has entered an
appearance 9' but then failed to answer or defend, the defendant is entitled to notice
of the application for defaultjudgment. 92 If no appearance was entered, notice of the
application for default judgment need not be given to the defendant.93
Rule 1-055 authorizes the court to hold a hearing to determine "the truth of any
averment" 94 prior to granting a judgment by default. Before the adoption of
comparative fault, there was seldom occasion to hold a hearing concerning the
substantive merits of plaintiffs claim because "[b]y virtue of the default, the
defendants have admitted the allegations of the complaint" and "[t]hese averments
are taken as true .... The allegations of the complaint, in effect, become findings of
fact." 95 Though allegations concerning the merits were deemed to be true, the
plaintiffs assertion of the amount of unliquidated damages was not binding.9 6
Instead, "[w]here damages are unliquidated and uncertain, Rule 55(b).. .requires
plaintiff to prove the extent of the injuries established by the default." 97
Whether the defaulting defendant receives formal notice of the application for
default judgment or learns of it in some other way, the defaulting defendant has the
right to participate in the mandatory hearing to determine the amount of
unliquidated damages.98 At the hearing, the defendant has the right to cross-examine
witnesses and to present evidence that might mitigate the amount of damages. 99

89. Rule 1-055(A) NMRA.
90. See Rule 1-055(B) NMRA.
91. See Rule 1-089(A) NMRA (providing that an attorney is required to file entry of appearance).
92. Rule 1-055(B) NMRA.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Gallegos, 89 N.M. at 123, 547 P.2d at 1165. If the complaint is so poorly drafted that it would not
survive a Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff will not obtain a default
judgment: "Even after default, however, it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts
constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit mere conclusions of law." 10A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2688, at 63 (3d ed. 1998); see Gallegos,

89 N.M. at 123, 547 P.2d at 1165 ("A default judgment entered on well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
establishes defendant's liability.") (citation omitted).
96. Gallegos, 89 N.M. at 123, 547 P.2d at 1165. Averments in a complaint "other than those as to the
amount of damage, are admitted" if no answer is filed. Rule 1-008(D) NMRA.
97. Gallegos, 89 N.M. at 123, 547 P.2d at 1165. Rule 1-055(B) NMRA provides that the court "may"
conduct a hearing to determine the amount of damages but case law requires that a hearing be held to determine
the amount of unliquidated damages. DeFillipo v. Neil, 2002-NMCA-085, 19, 51 P.3d 1183, 1188 ("Rule 1055(B), as well as established case law, clearly states that the trial court must hold a hearing to determine the
amount of any unliquidated damages before it may enter a default judgment."); Armijo v. Armijo, 98 N.M. 518,
520, 650 P.2d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 1982) ("[Where the claim for damages is unliquidated, it would be an abuse of
discretion not to have a hearing and to put plaintiff to the test of presenting evidence to support the claim for
damages.").
98. Gallegos, 89 N.M. at 123-24, 547 P.2d at 1165-66.
99. "[U]pon assessment of damages following entry of default, the defaulting defendant has the right to
cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses and to introduce affirmative testimony on his own behalf in mitigation of
damages." Id. at 123, 547 P.2d at 1165.
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2. The Effect of Comparative Negligence and Several Liability on Default
Judgment Practice
The adoption of comparative negligence and several liability led to reconsideration of whether the defaulting party could raise issues other than the amount of
damages at the unliquidated damages hearing. In adopting comparative negligence,
the supreme court emphasized that the purpose of the doctrine is to assure "apportionment of the total damages.. .in proportion to the fault of each party."'" The
court noted that new procedural problems would inevitably arise from the adoption
must be adjusted and made suitable
of the new doctrines' ° ' and stated that "the ' rules
2
to fit the changes in the substantive law."' 1
In Passinov. CascadeSteel Fabricators,Inc., °3 the court of appeals considered
whether the adoption of comparative negligence and several liability required
adjustment of the scope of the damages-determination hearing in default judgment
cases."° Passino sued Cascade and Timberman's, alleging that their negligence
caused him to suffer personal injuries." 5 Cascade defaulted and Timberman's
settled."° Cascade asserted that, at the hearing to determine its liability for
unliquidated damages, the court should permit Cascade to present evidence not only
as to the dollar amount of plaintiffs damages, but also as to the comparative
negligence of plaintiff and the comparative fault of the settling co-defendant.'0 7 The
trial court allowed this expansion of the scope of the hearing. 8 The court of
appeals reversed, holding that a defaulting defendant could dispute the extent and
the dollar value of the plaintiff's damages but could not reduce its liability for those
damages by laying off fault on the plaintiff or other wrongdoers." ° Citing the
leading New Mexico pre-several liability case on default judgments," ° the court
held that, "[b]y defaulting, defendant has waived its rights to the application of
comparative negligence and the apportionment of damages under Scott v. Rizzo and
Bartlett.""' 1 Without grappling with the policy implications of Scott and Bartlett,
the court of appeals concluded that disallowing evidence of the fault of others was
seriously weaken, and could even
necessary because "any other holding would
' 12
abolish the efficacy of default judgments." "

100. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 688, 634 P.2d 1234, 1240 (1981).
101. Id.
102. Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689, 693, 712 P.2d 1351, 1355 (1985).
103. 105 N.M. 457, 734 P.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1986), overruledby Burge v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 1997NMSC-009, 933 P.2d 210.
104. Id. at 458, 734 P.2d at 236.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 459, 734 P.2d at 237.
110. Gallegos,89 N.M. 118, 547 P.2d 1160.
111. Passino, 105 N.M. at 459, 734 P.2d at 237 (citing Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682,634 P.2d 1234 (1981);
Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982)).
112. Id.
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Other jurisdictions have reached the same result.113 A Pennsylvania court, for
example, noted that while comparative fault has relevance to the assessment of the
proper amount of damages, it "is primarily a substantive defense going to a
plaintiffs' [sic] right to recover and, therefore, is not available as a defense to a
defendant against whom a defaultjudgment has been entered." '" 4 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court justified a similar result by noting the unfairness to the plaintiff of
allowing the defendant to contest comparative fault in the damages hearing: "[T]he
plaintiffs would have the burden of proving liability without the benefit of
discovery at a hearing on what traditionally has been designed to be only for proof
of the plaintiffs' damages.""' 5
The New Mexico Supreme Court changed the law in 1997 in Burge v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co." 6 In Burge, the plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defaulting
defendant was the sole and proximate cause of the plaintiff s injuries.' 17 Consistent
with existing law," 8 the trial court ruled that the effect of the default was to
transform the factual allegation that the defendant's negligence was the sole cause
of the plaintiff s injuries into a finding of fact.1 9 Overruling Passino,the supreme
court held that a defaulting defendant who appears at the unliquidated damages
hearing can not only dispute the dollar value of the plaintiff's damages, but may
also seek to prove the comparative fault of the plaintiff and the fault of other tortfeasors in order to reduce the defaulter's liability: "A defaulting party admits only
to the liability aspect of the complaint, thus reserving for the damages hearing a
determination of damages in accordance with the application of comparative
negligence and apportionment of damages under Scott v. Rizzo. . .andBartlettv. New
Mexico Welding Supply.... "120 In effect, the court ruled that a defendant's default
admits only that it is liable for some portion of the damages suffered by the plaintiff
but preserves the right to dispute "the dollar amount of the damages suffered by the
injured party andthe portion of those damages to be awarded against the defaulting
party based upon the extent of the percentage of its negligence."12
The Burge court's decision is not unique. Other jurisdictions also allow the
defaulting defendant to raise comparative negligence and several liability defenses
at the damages hearing.' E Others go further, allowing the defaulting defendant to

113. E.g., Osten Staffing Servs., Inc. v. D.A. Stinger Servs., Inc., 921 P.2d 596 (Wyo. 1996); Fulton County
Hosp. Auth. v. Hyman, 376 S.E.2d 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Thomas v. Duquesne Light Co., 545 A.2d 289 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988); Calise v. Hidden Valley Condo. Ass'n, 773 A.2d 834 (R.I. 2001).
114. Thomas, 545 A.2d at 295.
115. Calise, 773 A.2d at 841.
116. 1997-NMSC-009, 933 P.2d 210.
117. See id. 49, 933 P.2d at 222-23 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
118. Gallegos, 89 N.M. at 123, 547 P.2d at 1165.
119. Burge, 1997-NMSC-009, 1 49, 933 P.2d at 222-23 (McKinnon, J., dissenting); see Rule 1-008(D)
NMRA (providing that failure to deny assertions in a complaint is deemed an admission except as to allegations
concerning the amount of damages).
120. Burge, 1997-NMSC-009, 22, 933 P.2d at 217 (citations omitted).
121. ld. 1 24, 933 P.2d at 217.
122. McGavin-Moberly Constr. Co. v. Welden, 897 P.2d 1310, 1317 (Wyo. 1995); Gresham v. Prod. Mgmt.,
Inc., 868 So. 2d 171 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Jordon v. Elex, Inc., 611 N.E.2d 852 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Fehlhaber
v. Indian Trails, Inc., 425 F.2d 715, 717 (3d Cir. 1970) (Delaware law).
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prove that its negligence was not a proximate cause of the injury,' 23 that damages
should be reduced due to plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages 24 and permitting
proof of "related issues." ' 5
Passinofocused on the need to sanction the defaulting defendant. 2 6 The Burge
court found stronger countervailing policies that justified a less harsh penaltycomparative negligence and several liability.' 27 In effect, the court decided that it
is more important that liability be based on the defendant's actual percentage of
fault than that the full responsibility for a plaintiffs injuries be visited upon a
defendant as a sanction for failure to answer or otherwise defend.
3. Procedural Ramifications of Burge
Accommodating the goal of "apportionment of the total damages... in proportion
to the fault of each party"'128 in default judgment cases will require adjustments in
default judgment procedure to assure that the plaintiff receives advance notice of
the specific issues the defaulter will29 raise and the witnesses and evidence the
defaulter will present at the hearing.
Burge puts a plaintiff on notice that the defaulting defendant might appear and
present evidence of the plaintiff's comparative negligence and the fault of others,
but this alone does not provide the plaintiff and the non-defaulting defendants with
adequate notice to prepare for the damages hearing. They can be surprised by the
unannounced appearance of the defaulting defendant who now can present
witnesses proving the misconduct of plaintiff, the other defendants, and non-party
tortfeasors. 30 Rule 1-055 does not require that the defaulting defendant serve a

123. Schaub v. Wilson, 969 P.2d 552,559 (Wyo. 1998); Jordon, 611 N.E.2d at 855. Contra Kalamazoo Oil
Co. v. Boerman, 618 N.W.2d 66, 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (proximate cause is admitted by act of defaulting).
New Mexico has not yet ruled on whether the defaulting defendant can avoid any liability by
demonstrating that plaintiff cannot prove that the defaulter's conceded negligence was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury. Nothing in Burge suggests that a defaulting defendant can dispute proximate cause. To the
contrary, the court held that the defaulter "admits only to the liability of his or her portion of the damages," leaving
only the dollar amount of damages and "the extent of its percentage of negligence" to be resolved by the jury.
Burge, 1997-NMSC-009, 24, 933 P.2d at 217.
124. Olsten Staffing Servs., Inc., 921 P.2d at 600; Jordon, 611 N.E.2d at 855. New Mexico has always
allowed the defendant to reduce damages by showing plaintiffs failure to mitigate damages. Gallegos, 89 N.M.
at 123,547 P.2d at 1165 (stating that defaulting defendant may "introduce affirmative testimony on his own behalf
in mitigation of damages").
125. Jordon, 611 N.E.2d at 855.
126. Passino, 105 N.M. at 458, 734 P.2d at 236.
127. Burge, 1997-NMSC-009, 24,933 P.2d at 217.
128. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 688, 634 P.2d 1234, 1240 (1981).
129. It is not clear what role the non-defaulting defendants would play in a liquidated damages hearing that
took place before the trial on the merits. To assure consistency of results between the damages hearing and the trial,
the percentages of fault established at the hearing would have to be binding on the plaintiff and the non-defaulting
defendants. To bind the non-defaulting defendants would require giving them a full and fair opportunity to
participate in the damages hearing. If, however, all parties participate in and are bound by the results of the
damages hearing, the effect would be to transform that hearing into the trial on the merits, obviating the need for
a trial. For this reason, it is preferable that, where there are non-defaulting defendants, there should be no damages
hearing; instead, the trial on the merits should also serve the function of the damages hearing. See infra notes
146-186 and accompanying text.
130. The plaintiff may enter the hearing without any notice that the defaulting defendant will seek to prove
the fault of others and without any hint that there are other potential wrongdoers. When the defaulting defendant
seeks to lay off fault on non-defaulting co-defendants, the plaintiff should be less surprised because the plaintiff
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tardy entry of appearance' 3' or serve an answer to the complaint prior to appearing
at the hearing to determine damages. 132 Under the existing rules, therefore, the
plaintiff and non-defaulting defendants will not know in advance whether the
defaulter will appear at the hearing, and, if so, which of the available issues the
defaulter will raise or what witnesses and evidence the defaulter will present at the
hearing. The defaulting defendant might appear and lay off fault on a non-party
whose existence was unknown to the plaintiff. The plaintiff thus could be worse off
having obtained an entry of default than if the defaulting defendant, instead of
defaulting, had filed a timely answer identifying disputed issues and raising
affirmative defenses prior to trial.
Some jurisdictions permit the defaulting defendant to conduct discovery as a
necessary corollary to the right to appear and present evidence at the damages
hearing.' 33 The process for getting a defaultjudgment would be greatly complicated
if a defaulting defendant could insist that the damages hearing be delayed until the
defaulter had completed discovery regarding comparative fault and the fault of
others, matters made relevant by Burge. New Mexico courts will have to determine
whether the quest for liability based on comparative fault is so important that the
defaulting party should be free to engage in discovery prior to the unliquidated
damages hearing despite the ramifications: delay, added expense, and the
diminished impact of the sanction
for failure to defend that will inevitably follow
34
if the courts permit discovery.
Even if the courts conclude that the defaulter has forfeited its right to engage in
discovery, the plaintiff will have a legitimate claim to be allowed discovery prior
to a damages hearing at which the defaulter may appear and defend. The plaintiff
might need discovery in order to rebut the defaulting defendant's anticipated
defenses of comparative negligence' 3 5 and the negligence of non-parties. Discovery
to determine the extent of the defaulting defendant's breach of duty also will be
appropriate. Though the defendant concedes fault by defaulting, the determination
of comparative fault will require that plaintiff seek to prove the percentage of the

has identified those wrongdoers and must prove their fault in any case. So too, plaintiff will not suffer the same
degree of surprise if the defaulting defendant charges the plaintiff with comparative negligence when that defense
has been raised by non-defaulting defendants.
131. Rule 1-089 requires that, with a single exception, "[w]henever an attorney undertakes to represent a
party, the attorney shall file a written entry of appearance," Rule 1-089(A) NMRA, but sets no time for filing the
notice of appearance. An attorney representing a defaulting party at the unliquidated damages hearing thus might
not enter the appearance until the date set for the default judgment hearing.
132. See Rule 1-055 NMRA.
133. Clague v. Bednarski, 105 F.R.D. 552, 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) ('There would be little point in allowing
a defendant to contest the amount of damages if the defendant is not permitted adequately to prepare for the hearing
on damages."); Bashforth v. Zampini, 576 A.2d 1197, 1200 (R.I. 1990); Olsten Staffing Servs., Inc. v. D.A. Stinger
Servs., Inc., 921 P.2d 596, 600 (Wyo. 1996); McGarvin-Moberly Constr. Co. v. Welden, 897 P.2d 1310, 1317
(Wyo. 1995); Dungan v. Superior Court, 512 P.2d 52, 53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973).
134. New Mexico's discovery rules allow a "party" to engage in discovery without distinguishing between
parties in default and other parties. See, e.g., Rule 1-026(A) NMRA. Rule 1-055 identifies the defaulting defendant
as a "party." Rule 1-055(A) NMRA.
135. Presumably the need for discovery to rebut a claim that plaintiff is comparatively negligent will be less
compelling than the need to prepare to rebut evidence that others are at fault, because the relevant evidence of
plaintiff's negligence often will consist of the testimony of the plaintiff and others of whom the plaintiff may be
aware.
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defaulting defendant's
fault compared to that of the plaintiff or other alleged
36
wrongdoers. 1
The transformation of the damages hearing into a near-replica of a normal trial
is further fostered in New Mexico by the requirement that, at the damages hearing,
the court "shall accord a right of trial by jury to the parties entitled thereto.' ' 37 If the
plaintiff or a non-defaulting defendant makes a timely demand for ajury trial, 138 the
issues of the amount of damages, the fault of plaintiff, and the fault of others must
be tried to a jury unless the remaining parties withdraw the demand for jury trial. 139
A party may waive the right to trial by jury in writing or orally, 4 ' but a demand for
jury trial "may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties" to the action.' 4
Although Rule 1-038 provides that a party waives the right to trial by jury by failure
to appear at the trial, 4 2 the rule does not address the different issue of whether a
defaulting defendant who does appear at the damages hearing can claim a right to
jury trial based upon another party's demand. Florida courts have concluded that a
plaintiff may not unilaterally withdraw its jury demand even if the defendant is in
default. 143 The Utah Court of Appeals has ruled that its version of the relevant rule
allows the plaintiff to waive its prior demand forjury trial without the concurrence
of a defaulting party."4 The issue was raised, but
45 not resolved, in a recent case
decided by the New Mexico Court of Appeals.1
136. The plaintiff will often have an interest in the allocation of fault between the defaulting tortfeasor and
others. When the other tortfeasors are non-defaulting defendants, and the defaulting defendant lacks assets to pay
the judgment, the plaintiff will seek to minimize the degree of fault of the defaulting defendant. Where the defaulter
has sufficient assets to pay any judgment, or where the defaulter may seek to lay off fault on persons who are not
parties to the lawsuit, it may be in plaintiff's interest to maximize the fault of the defaulting defendant.
137. Rule 1-055(B) NMRA. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) provides that, in cases of default, there
must be a jury trial on damages only "when and as required by any statute of the United States." Courts have
construed the provision to not require ajury trial generally even if the plaintiff made timely demand for jury trial;
a jury trial is required only when, as in 28 U.S.C. § 1874 (2000) (recovery on bonds and covenants), a federal
statute specifically requires ajury trial after default has occurred. See Benz v. Skiba, Skiba & Glomski, 164 F.R.D.
115 (D. Me. 1995). The federal courts, influenced by different language in Federal Rule 55, have concluded that
"[n]either the Seventh Amendment nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require ajury trial to assess damages
after entry of default." Graham v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 314 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, one
federal court has concluded that "it is the better practice, if not actually compelled, that the issue as to damages be
submitted to the jury" when the plaintiff has made a timely demand for ajury trial. Barber v. Turberville, 218 F.2d
34, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (footnote omitted).
138. Plaintiff must serve ajury demand "not later than ten (10) days after service of the last pleading directed
to such issue." Rule 1-038(A) NMRA. When the sole defendant defaults by failing to answer the complaint,
plaintiff must make the demand within ten days of the service of the complaint.
139. Rule 1-038(D) provides that a party may waive the right to trial by jury in writing or orally, see Rule
1-038(D)(4)-(5) NMRA. However, a demand for jury trial "may not be withdrawn without the consent of the
parties" to the action. Rule 1-038(D) NMRA. It is not clear whether the consent of a party who is in default for
failure to answer or defend is entitled to the protection afforded by this rule. Although Rule 1-038(D) provides that
a party waives the right to trial by jury by failure to appear at the trial, the rule does not address the different issue
of a defaulting defendant who does appear at the damages hearing.
140. See Rule 1-038(D)(4)-(5) NMRA.
141. Rule 1-038(D) NMRA.
142. Id.
143. Baron Auctioneer, Inc. v. Ball, 674 So. 2d 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Loiselle v. Gladfelter, 160
So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1964).
144. Anica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that, unlike other
jurisdictions, Utah does not explicitly preserve right to jury trial in any default judgment case).
145. DeFillippo v. Neil, 2002-NMCA-085,1 35,51 P.3d 1183, 1191 ("We leave for another day the decision
regarding whether a jury trial on damages is required when a default judgment is entered on liability due to the
failure to timely answer the complaint.").
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When the defaulting party is the only defendant, the damages hearing is the sole
forum for the determination of damages and fault. Where, however, plaintiff sues
multiple defendants and at least one defendant has not defaulted, the issues become
more complicated."6 After the default of one of multiple defendants, the trial of the
plaintiff's claims against the remaining defendants provides an alternative forum for
resolving issues that arise in the unliquidated damages hearing. In Frow v. De La
Vega,'47 the plaintiff sued eight defendants charging that each was jointly liable
with the others for conspiracy to commit fraud.'48 When one defendant defaulted,
the court immediately entered a final judgment for full liability against the
defaulter.' 49 At the subsequent trial, the other seven defendants were found not
liable on a ground that was equally applicable to the defaulting defendant. 50 The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment against the defaulting defendant. 5 ' The
Court noted the "incongruity" of holding one defendant liable when the trial
demonstrated that none should be liable,' and declared the result to be "unseemly
and absurd, as well as unauthorized by law."' 53 Instead, "[t]he true mode of proceeding"' 5' is to enter only a default against the non-responding defendant, to
proceed with the trial of the remaining defendants in that party's absence, and to
give the benefit of a victory by the remaining defendants to the defaulting defendant'55 if the defendants' victory is based on a ground equally applicable to the
defaulting defendant.'56 If the remaining defendants were found liable, the court

146. One such issue is whether the admission of liability that results from the default benefits not only the
plaintiff but also any non-defaulting co-defendants. For example, can the co-defendant who seeks to lay off fault
on the defaulting co-defendant use the fact of default to establish that the defaulting defendant is liable to the
plaintiff, thus making proof of liability by the co-defendant unnecessary? Clearly, where the co-defendant raised
the issue of the fault of the defaulting defendant by way of a cross claim and the defaulting party failed to answer
either the complaint or the cross-claim, the co-defendant can rely on the default to establish liability. See Rule 1007(A) NMRA (providing that defendant must file an answer to a cross claim); Rule 1-008(D) NMRA (providing
that failure to deny in a pleading responding to a cross-claim constitutes an admission to all averments in the
pleadings except as to damages). Less clear is whether the defendant who raises the fault of the defaulting codefendant as an affirmative defense without filing a pleading against the co-defendant, see Tipton v. Texaco, Inc.,
103 N.M. 689, 692, 712 P.2d 1351, 1354 (1985) (stating that the fault of others "may be raised as an affirmative
defense"), is entitled to take advantage of the admission of liability that results from the defaulting party's failure
to respond to the plaintiff's complaint.
147. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 552 (1872).
148. Id. at 553.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 555.
152. Id. at 554.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. The trial court should:
[E]nter a default and a formal decreeproconfesso against him, and proceed with the cause upon
the answers of the other defendants.... [I]f the suit should be decided against the complainant
on the merits, the bill will be dismissed as to all the defendants alike-the defaulter as well as
the others.
Id.
156. E.g., In re First T.D. & Inv., Inc., 253 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2001). The New Mexico Supreme Court
considered the applicability of Frow to tort cases involving joint and several liability in United Salt Corp. v.
McKee, 96 N.M. 65, 628 P.2d 310 (1981). Plaintiff sued two employees and their employer, asserting that the
employer was vicariously liable for the tort of the employees. Id. at 67, 628 P.2d at 312. When the employees
defaulted, the court entered a final judgment for the plaintiff against the employees based on the demand in the
complaint and without a hearing on liability or damages. Id. The supreme court concluded that it was error to enter
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would enter judgment against both defaulting and non-defaulting
parties for the
5 7
amount determined in the trial of the non-defaulting parties. 1
Federal courts have not limited Frow to cases involving defendants who are
jointly and severally liable. In ShanghaiAutomation Instrument Co. v. Kuei,' 58 the
court reviewed the cases applying Frow and concluded that the common factor is
notjoint and several liability, but rather "whether under the theory of the complaint,
liability of all the defendants must be uniform,"'5 9 and whether "uniformity of
liability is.. .required by the facts and theories of the case."' 6 Because the central
premise of New Mexico's doctrine of several liability is that all parties would be
liable in keeping with their relative fault,' 61 allocations of fault that exceed one
hundred percent would be inconsistent and illogical, 62 and thus Frow should be
applied.
The defaulting party should get the benefits and suffer the consequences of the
decisions at trial that are common to the liability of the defaulting and the nondefaulting parties. 63 Because the dollar value of compensatory damages suffered
by the plaintiff is the same as to each defendant in a tort case, the amount of
damages determined at the trial should be binding on the defaulting defendant as it
is on the non-defaulting defendants. Because the fault of all tortfeasors, both
defendants and non-parties, is litigated at the trial,' 6 and because the total fault
assessed should equal one hundred percent,' 65 it would be logically inconsistent
with the trial results if the defaulting defendant suffered a judgment reflecting a
percentage of fault different from that assessed to it at the trial. To assure symmetry,
the trial of the non-defaulting parties should serve as the Rule 1-055 hearing for the
defaulting party. If the trial defendants escape all liability based on a defense
common to all defendants, the defaulting defendant should share in that victory.' 66
If the plaintiff is victorious at trial, the amount of damages awarded the plaintiff and

judgment for the amount requested in the complaint, and ruled that the court should defer the determination of the
amount of damages until the trial of the employer on the merits. Id. at 69, 628 P.2d at 314. This portion of the
opinion is consistent with Frow. The court concluded, however, that, though the employer could seek to prove that
the employees were not negligent, the trial court correctly entered judgment against the employees. Id. This portion
of the opinion effectively deprived the defaulting defendants of the benefits of a possible victory at trial by the
employer based on a finding that the employees were not negligent. This portion of the opinion is inconsistent with
the reasoning in Frow.In City ofAlbuquerque v. Huddleston,55 N.M. 240,230 P.2d 972 (1951), the court refused
to allow a defaulting defendant to have the advantage of a ruling at the trial of the remaining defendants that the
statute of limitations provided a valid affirmative defense to the plaintiff's claims to the defendants' separate
parcels of land. id. at 55, 230 P.2d at 274. The court suggested that if the defaulting party had been a joint owner
of the same property as the non-defaulting party, the court would have extended the benefits of the successful
defense to the defaulting party. Id.
157. 1OA WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 95, § 2690, at 75.
158. 194 F. Supp. 2d 995 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

159. Id. at 1008.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 15.
162. Fault percentages must total one hundred percent. UJI 13-2219 NMRA.
163. See United Salt Corp. v. McKee, 96 N.M. 65, 628 P.2d 310 (1981).
164. See Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982).
165. UJI 13-2219 NMRA.
166. But see United Salt Corp. v. McKee, 96 N.M. 65, 628 P.2d 310 (1981); City of Albuquerque v.
Huddleston, 55 N.M. 240, 230 P.2d 972 (1951) (decided prior to adoption of several liability).
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the percentage of fault attributable to the defaulting party should determine the
amount of the judgment awarded against the defaulter.
This result was foreshadowed in a ruling of the New Mexico Court of Appeals
167
in a case not involving several liability for tortious conduct. In Blea v. Sandoval,
the parties disputed title to land. 168 The court had to determine the effect of an
earlier proceeding in which defendants were husband and wife, the husband
defaulted, and the wife successfully defended on the merits. 169 The court of appeals
ruled that the wife's prior victory on the merits should have resulted in judgment
for the defaulting husband. 70 The court set forth two principles that are equally
applicable to tort cases involving several liability: first, "when there are multiple
parties involved in a single suit, entry of a default as to one party will not result in
a default judgment prior to termination of the matter with the non-defaulting
parties,"' 17 ' and second, "the defaulting defendants are entitled to take advantage of
.unless the
a successful defense interposed by the non-defaulting defendants..
72
defense interposed was personal to the non-defaulting defendant."'
The right of participation for the defaulting party at the trial of non-defaulting
defendants is not clear. Frow held that the defaulting defendant had forfeited the
right to participate in pretrial proceedings or at the trial of the remaining
defendants. 73 In Burge, unlike Frow, there were no non-defaulting defendants. 7
Burge ruled only that the defaulting defendant can participate in the unliquidated
damages hearing held in lieu of a trial. 7 1 When there are remaining defendants who
will contest liability and the extent of plaintiff's damages, there is less need for the
presence and participation of the defaulting defendant. In such cases, the participation rights of the defaulter at the trial of the remaining defendants should depend
upon the extent to which the interests of the defaulter and the remaining defendants
diverge. When, as in Frow, the remaining defendants and the defaulting defendants
have common defenses and interests, it might be appropriate to bar the defaulting
party from the trial as a sanction for having defaulted. The remaining defendants
will represent and pursue the interests of the defaulting party as they defend their
own interests.
The doctrine of several liability, however, introduces an element of conflict
between the defaulting and defending parties. Both have the same interest in
minimizing the amount of plaintiff s damages and maximizing the percentage of

167. 107 N.M. 554, 761 P.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1988).
168. Id. at 555, 761 P.2d at 433.
169. Id. at 556, 761 P.2d at 434.
170. id. at 560, 761 P.2d at 438.
171. Id. at 559, 761 P.2d at 437.
172. Id. Compareid. with City of Albuquerque v. Huddleston, 55 N.M. 240, 230 P.2d 972 (1951) (finding
that defendants' victory based on statute of limitations does not redound to benefit of defaulting defendant because
statute of limitations defense is a "personal defense" that must be raised by defaulting defendant).
173. "The defaulting defendant has merely lost his standing in court. He will not be entitled to service of
notices in the cause, nor to appear in it in any way. He can adduce no evidence, he cannot be heard at the final
hearing." Frow,82 U.S. at 554. Where the only defendant is the defaulting party, the defaulter can appear at the
damages hearing to prove all defenses except defenses regarding its own liability for some portion of the damages.
See Burge, 1997-NMSC-009, 933 P.2d 210.
174. Burge, 1997-NMSC-009, 1,933 P.2d at 211.
175. Id. 1 21, 933 P.2d at 216.
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fault attributable to the plaintiff, and non-party tortfeasors, but the defendant wants
to lay off as much fault as possible on the defaulter and the defaulter wants to
achieve the opposite result. At the trial, therefore, the defaulting party should be
allowed to cross-examine defendants' witnesses and to present evidence to prove
the comparative negligence of non-defaulting defendants. 176 As to these issues, the
defaulting party can "make [a] material contribution in aiding the trier of fact in the
search for truth,"' 77 and thus perhaps should be allowed to participate at the trial.' 78
In theory, then, in multiple defendant cases the defaulting defendant logically
could be barred from separately contesting the amount of plaintiff's damages, the
plaintiffs comparative fault, and the fault of non-party tortfeasors, because the
remaining defendants will vigorously pursue those issues. In contrast, the court
should consider allowing the defaulting party to introduce proof seeking to
minimize its own fault and to maximize the fault of the other defendants. The trial
court has ample authority to try the issues separately, 179 thus cabining the defaulting
defendant's participation rights. In reality, the court may be unable to separate trial
of the issues in which the defaulter can and cannot participate. 180 Ifthe court cannot
do so, the logic of Burge suggests that the court should opt to allow the defaulting
party greater rather than fewer participation rights at the trial of the non-defaulting
defendants.
Even limited participation of the defaulting party at the trial will be unfair to the
non-defaulting defendants, and possibly to the plaintiff,' 81 unless they are given
adequate notice of the defenses to be asserted and the evidence to be produced by
the defaulting party at trial. The court also will have to determine whether it is fair
to non-defaulting parties to allow the defaulting party to engage in discovery,' 82

176. Id. 22, 933 P.2d at 217; Gallegos v. Franklin, 89 N.M. 118, 123, 547 P.2d 1160, 1165 (Ct. App.
1976).
177. Gallegos,89 N.M. at 124,547 P.2d at 1166 (quoting Dungan v. Superior Court, 512 P.2d 52,54 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1973)).
178. One issue that might affect the decision whether to expand the participation rights of the defaulter at
the trial of other defendants is the question of whether the defaulting party must be allowed to participate in pretrial
discovery proceedings. Permitting discovery by the defaulting party concerning the fault of other tortfeasors would
seem to be a necessary precondition to effective presentation at trial of the defaulting party's evidence establishing
fault of the other tortfeasors. But Frow, 82 U.S. at 554, would bar the defaulting defendant from participating in
discovery after defaulting, and parties who are in default for failure to appear need not be served with discovery
documents. Rule 1-005(A) NMRA. If discovery rights must accompany trial-participation rights, a court may be
reluctant to extend participation rights to a defaulting party.
179. Rule 1-042(B) NMRA; Bolton v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 119 N.M. 355, 890 P.2d 808 (Ct. App.
1994).
180. The issue of the plaintiffs comparative negligence cannot be isolated from that of the defendants and
defaulting party, for example, because the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff is determined in part by
the percentage of fault attributed to the tortfeasors.
181. Even if limited to contesting its fault compared to the fault of other wrongdoers, the defaulting party's
participation at trial might have a negative impact on the plaintiff. The plaintiff will not care how fault is allocated
among the tortfeasors and thus will have no stake in the defaulting defendant's attempt to allocate a large portion
of the fault to co-tortfeasors if all wrongdoers are before the court and each has assets sufficient to pay whatever
portion of the damages are allocated to it. When some wrongdoers are not defendants or some defendants lack
assets, however, the plaintiff may want to allocate fault among the tortfeasors differently from the preference of
the defaulting defendant.
182. Frow, 82 U.S. at 554, would bar the defaulting defendant from participating in discovery after
defaulting, but discovery by the defaulting party relevant to the fault of other tortfeasors would seem to be a
necessary precondition to effective presentation at trial of evidence establishing fault of other tortfeasors.
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attend depositions conducted by other parties, 183 and receive notice of and
participate in proceedings brought by the other parties.' 84
The court also must consider the possibility that the trial of the non-defaulting
defendants may not take place. The remaining defendants may obtain a summary
judgment of non-liability or they may settle with the plaintiff.'8 5 Where no nondefaulting defendants remain, the scheduled trial will revert to86the damages hearing
that occurs when the defaulting party is the only defendant.
4. Proposed Modification of Current Default Judgment Practice
Certain aspects of the existing system for dealing with defaulting defendants in
several liability cases need change. The root of the problem is the Gallegos court's
ruling that a defaulting party has an absolute right to show up, apparently
unannounced, and to participate in the damages hearing.'8 7 The problem is exacerbated by the expansion of the issues that the defaulting party may litigate pursuant
to Burge. 88 The existing premise is that the quest for a determination of the merits
is so strong that any defaulting party, no matter the reason for the default, must be
allowed to dispute not only the amount of damages but also the defaulter's percentage of fault at the hearing. This goes too far when the defaulter has no excuse for
failing to answer or otherwise defend. The right of the defaulter to participate
should be conditioned on a demonstration by the defaulting party that the default
was not intentional but in some fashion excusable. 8 9 By thus conditioning participation rights, the court can strike a balance between the desire to reach the merits
and the need to enforce the rules of civil procedure.
There is no need to change any rule of procedure to accomplish this reform. Rule
1-055(C) already provides that the court can set aside an entry of default before
entering final judgment for "good cause shown."'" The defaulting party who seeks

183. Service of discovery notices need not be made on parties who are in default for failure to appear. Rule
1-005(A) NMRA.
184. Motions and other written notices normally need not be served on a party in default for failure to appear.
Rule 1-005(A) NMRA.
185. In Passinov. Cascade Steel Fabricators,Inc., 105 N.M. 457,734 P.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1986), overruled
by Burge v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 1997-NMSC-009, 933 P.2d 210, the trial court initially decided that the
defaulting defendant's liability would be determined at the trial of the non-defaulting defendant. Id. at 457, 734
P.2d at 235. When the remaining defendant settled with the plaintiff, the plaintiff requested and the court ordered
an evidentiary hearing to determine the liability of the defaulting defendant. Id.
186. See id. In Passino,Judge Bivins wrote separately to discuss a question not reached by the majority: how
should the amount of the damages assessed against the defaulting defendant be adjusted in light of the amount of
the settlement by the non-defaulting party? Id. at 459, 734 P.2d at 237. Because Passinoruled that the defaulting
party could not lay off fault on others, the Passinocourt anticipated that the defaulting defendant would be fully
liable for all of the damages the plaintiff suffered, with a setoff only of the amount received in settlement of the
claim against the other tortfeasor. Id. at 459, 734 P.2d at 239 (Bivins, J., concurring); see NMSA 1978, § 41-3-4
(2004). Because Burge allows the defaulting defendant to lay off fault on other tortfeasors, see Burge, 1997NMSC-009, 22, 933 P.2d at 217, the defaulting defendant is no longer fully liable, but is only severally liable
for its percentage of fault, and there is no setoff of the defaulting defendant's liability by the amount of the nondefaulting party's settlement. See Wilson v. Gait, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App. 1983).
187. Gallegos, 89 N.M. at 123, 547 P.2d at 1165.
188. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
189. A showing "that the trial attorney's neglect was excusable, that there was a meritorious defense, and
that there were no intervening equities" provides a basis for setting aside a default. Chase v. Contractors' Equip.
& Supply Co., 100 N.M. 39, 43,665 P.2d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 1983).
190. Rule 1-055(C) NMRA.
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to participate in proceedings subsequent to defaulting should file a motion seeking
to set aside the entry of default. The liberal standard for granting a Rule 1-055(C)
motion 9' will often be met except in egregious cases. If the court grants the motion
unconditionally, the movant loses the status of a defaulting party and becomes a
party for all purposes. 92 This will avoid the need for any separate damages hearing.
Alternatively, the court can set aside the default conditionally, imposing certain
requirements or restraints on the party who seeks to be relieved of default.' 93 The
conditions imposed can take the form of limitations on the substantive issues that
the party can thereafter litigate or procedural limitations on the party. For example,
the court could require the party seeking to set aside the default to file a proposed
pleading, to agree to abide by completed discovery, to meet reasonable deadlines
for its own discovery, and to follow existing pretrial orders including deadlines contained therein.
No New Mexico case rejects the applicability of Rule 1-055(C) to parties in
default who want to participate in subsequent proceedings. Rather, the cases have
failed to consider its applicability. The benefits of applying the provision are
several. Requiring that the defaulting party file a motion to set aside the default
would provide the court with an opportunity to distinguish between defaulting
parties who did and did not have an acceptable reason for defaulting. The court
could grant the motion conditionally, setting conditions on the movant's participation in subsequent proceedings. It would also provide a welcome measure of
flexibility to the court and an opportunity for an orderly reintroduction of the
defaulting party into the lawsuit with the resulting elimination of issues that arise
when the substantive law of several liability intersects with existing law concerning
the procedural rights of defaulting parties.
B. Defendant's Response
The defendant's usual response to a complaint alleging that the defendant is fully
liable for the plaintiff s injuries is to deny any liability to the plaintiff and to assert
the comparative fault of the plaintiff as an affirmative defense. A defendant who
also wants to lay off fault on a tortfeasor not joined as a co-defendant 94 has three
191. The focus is on whether the defaulter's conduct "constituted contumacious conduct, intentional tactical
delay, or willful disregard for deadlines and procedural rules. Trial judges should set aside non-final default
judgments when the movant's conduct constitutes marginal and negligent failures to comply with the applicable
rules of procedure." De Fillippo v. Neil, 2002-NMCA-085, 29,51 P.3d 1183, 1190; see also Gandarav. Gandara,
2003-NMCA-036, 9,62 P.3d 1211, 1214 ("[B]ecause default judgments are generally disfavored, '[any doubts
about whether relief should be granted are resolved in favor of the defaulting defendant...") (quoting Dyer v.
Pacheco, 98 N.M. 670, 673, 651 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Ct. App. 1982)) (alteration in original); Enron Oil Corp. v.
Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cit. 1993).
192. See DeFillippo, 2002-NMCA-085, 36, 51 P.3d 1183, 1191 (reversing entry of default judgment and
remanding "for a trial on the merits").
193. 10A WRiGHT Er AL., supra note 95, § 2700, at 170, 172.
194. A defendant who wants to lay off fault on co-defendants can do so by raising the affirmative defense
of the fault of the co-tortfeasors. See UJI 13-302C NMRA (providing that fault of others is an affirmative defense).
Alternatively, or in addition, the defendant might file a cross claim against the co-defendant. Though the court did
not have occasion to discuss cross claims in Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689,712 P.2d 1351 (1985), the ruling
allowing the defendant to implead a non-party tortfeasor suggests that the court would allow one defendant to file
a cross claim against a co-defendant. The counterargument is that the use of impleader in several liability cases
fosters the goal of having all tortfeasors as parties, id. at 693, 712 P.2d 1355, in contrast to filing a cross claim
against an alleged tortfeasor who is already a party.
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options for doing so. In Tipton v. Texaco, Inc.,' 95 the New Mexico Supreme Court
96
ruled that the defendant can use Rule 1-014 to implead additional wrongdoers,1
and suggested that the defendant alternatively can seek to join them as necessary
parties under Rule 1-019,197 or can raise their fault as an affirmative defense without
joining them as parties. 98 Each option carries with it tactical benefits and detriments for the parties and impacts the judicial process in different ways.
1. Third-Party Practice
Soon after the supreme court decided Bartlett, the injured plaintiff in Tipton v.
Texaco, Inc.199 sued only Texaco. 2°" Texaco raised the issue of the fault of non-party
tortfeasors by impleading them under Rule 1-014.201 The trial court dismissed the
third-party complaints on the ground that Rule 1-014 was inapplicable in the
absence of joint and several liability. 20 2 The supreme court reversed. 20 3 The court
acknowledged that the abolition of several liability technically made Rule 1-014
unavailable to raise the defense of the fault of non-parties, 2°4 but allowed the use of
Rule 1-014 as part of the attempt "to tailor the theory of comparative negligence to
our legal system.' ' 20 5 The court expressed its desire that there be a single lawsuit to
apportion the fault of all tortfeasors, and its preference for including all tortfeasors
in the lawsuit. 2°6 An approved method of raising the Bartlett defense in New
Mexico, therefore, is for the defendant to implead alleged tortfeasors not joined as
defendants by the plaintiff2 0 7 even though the defendant may be seeking only to lay

195. 103 N.M. 689,712 P.2d 1351 (1985).
196. Id. at 692-93, 712 P.2d at 1354-55.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 692, 712 P.2d at 1354. Some jurisdictions bar defendants from laying off fault on non-parties, thus
precluding use of the affirmative defense approach when the other alleged wrongdoers are not parties. The effect
is to encourage the defendants to join non-party tortfeasors. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT

OF LIABILITY § B19 cmt. c (2000).
199. 103 N.M. 689,712 P.2d 1351 (1985).
200. Id. at 690, 712 P.2d at 1352.
201. Id. at 692, 712 P.2d at 1354.
202. Id. at 693, 712 P.2d at 1355.
203. Id. at 690, 712 P.2d at 1352.
204. Normally, impleader is reserved for use against a defendant who is "secondarily liable" to the defendant
for the plaintiff's injuries and is usually premised upon a right of contribution or indemnity in favor of a defendant
found liable for the full amount of plaintiffs damages. Id. at 691-92, 712 P.2d at 1353-54. Because the defendant
in a several liability case pays only its share of the judgment, "strict application of Rule 14 would not allow adefendant to bring in third parties merely on the grounds that they are concurrent tortfeasors." Id. at 692, 712 P.2d at
1354.
205. Id.
206. Id.at693,712P.2dat 1355.
207. Even if the defendant chooses to raise the issue by use of a third-party complaint, the defendant probably
should also raise the Bartlett issue as an affirmative defense in response to the plaintiff's complaint. In Tipton, the
defendant did not accompany the use of impleader with an assertion of the fault of others in the answer. ld. at 692,
712 P.2d at 1354. The court found that, "[c]onsidering the uncertain state of comparative negligence pleading
during that period," the defendant's failure to raise the issue in the answer, in addition to in the third-party
complaint, "should not have been fatal in itself." Id. The court may now be less forgiving, and the failure to raise
an affirmative defense in the answer constitutes a waiver of the defense unless the court allows a later amendment
to the pleadings. See, e.g., Fredenburgh v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 79 N.M. 593, 446 P.2d 868 (1968).
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off fault on them rather than to recover from them on a theory of contribution 218 or
indemnity.20
The use of Rule 1-014 to assert the partial defense of several liability places the
third-party defendant2 1 ° in an anomalous position. Unlike the typical situation in
which the third-party plaintiff21 ' seeks a money judgment for contribution or
indemnity, the third-party plaintiff who impleads a third-party defendant does not
seek affirmative relief. Instead, the pleading normally212 will allege only that the
third-party plaintiff seeks to reduce the plaintiff's verdict against it by the
23
percentage of fault attributable to the negligence of the third-party defendant.
Because no affirmative relief is sought, the third-party defendant has little reason
to defend vigorously, or indeed, even to reply to the third-party complaint.2 14 Only
if the plaintiff amends the complaint to add the third-party defendant as a defendant
in the plaintiffs action will the
third-party defendant be subjected to the risk of
5
21
suffering a money judgment.
A wrongdoer who has settled with the plaintiff likewise has no incentive to
participate in litigation when joined as a third-party defendant. In several liability
cases, settlement not only protects the settling tortfeasor from further liability to the

208. A plaintiff may allege that the named defendant is wholly liable (jointly and severally) for the plaintiff's
injuries and, alternatively, that the defendant is partially liable under several liability principles. The former
allegation supports a traditional claim for contribution against another alleged tortfeasor because contribution
continues to be available where there arejointly and severally liable tortfeasors. Otero v. Jordon Rest. Enters., 1996NMSC-047, n.4, 922 P.2d 569, 572 n.4.
209. In Tipton, Texaco pleaded a claim for contractual indemnity as well as a claim seeking to lay off fault
on one of the third-party defendants. 103 N.M. at 690, 712 P.2d at 1352.
210. The person whom the defendant joins pursuant to Rule 1-014 is the "third-party defendant." Rule I014(A) NMRA.
211. The defendant who impleads a person pursuant to Rule 1-014 is identified as a "third-party plaintiff'
in relation to the impleaded person who is a "third-party defendant." Rule 1-014(A) NMRA.
212. But see supra note 208.
213. See Tipton, 103 N.M. at 693, 712 P.2d at 1355 (holding that after elimination of right of contribution
in several liability cases, parties can now assert a comparative negligence theory in a third-party complaint).
214. Lacking an incentive to defend because the third-party plaintiff is not seeking affirmative relief, the
third-party defendant probably will default rather than defend. Where, however, the plaintiff or another injured
person might sue the third-party defendant in a subsequent lawsuit seeking affirmative relief, the third-party
defendant must consider the possibility that findings of liability and percentages of fault in the initial action might
serve as a basis for applying collateral estoppel against the third-party defendant in the later action. Collateral
estoppel requires that there be actual litigation and a necessary determination of the third-party defendant's liability.
Thompson v. Barngrover, 101 N.M. 216, 218, 680 P.2d 358, 359 (Ct. App. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). Default judgments do not constitute actual litigation and are not usually given collateral
estoppel effect. Blea v. Sandoval, 107 N.M. 554,558,761 P.2d 432,436 (Ct. App. 1988); RESTATEMENT(SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e (1982).
Nonetheless, an argument could be made that the issue of the defaulter's comparative fault was actually
litigated and necessarily determined at the trial of the plaintiffs claims against the named defendants and that the
defaulting third-party defendant should be bound to those findings because it had a full opportunity to participate
in the litigation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34 (1982) (stating that named parties who are
subject to jurisdiction are bound by and entitled to benefits of res judicata); id. cmt. a (stating that section 34
applies to both claim and issue preclusion); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-207(1) (1987) (stating without qualification
that the third-party defendant is bound by findings concerning its liability to the plaintiff).
215. The plaintiff "may" amend the complaint to allege aclaim against the impleaded third-party defendant,
Rule 1-014(A) NMRA, but need not do so. E.g., Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 1996)
(stating that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 permits but does not require plaintiff to amend pleading to state
claim against third-party defendant). A plaintiff may choose not to amend because of a belief that the third-party
defendant is not a tortfeasor or because the plaintiff prefers to await the outcome of the first case before deciding
whether to pursue the third-party tortfeasor in a separate, subsequent action.
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plaintiff, but also precludes an action for contribution by co-defendants.216 For that
reason, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has held that Rule 1-014 is not available
as a means for a defendant to raise the defense of the fault of a settling tortfeasor.
In Wilson v. Gillis,El7 the defendants sought to implead alleged tortfeasors who had
settled with the plaintiff prior to the plaintiff s lawsuit against the defendants. 21 ' The
trial court granted the settling parties' motion to dismiss the third-party complaint.2 9 The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal.22 The court reasoned that,
because settling defendants cannot be liable to the plaintiff beyond the amount of
the settlement, no matter what percentage of fault the factfinder attributes to the
settler, 2 ' the settling wrongdoers "cannot reasonably be expected to participate as
parties in the lawsuit. 222E Moreover, to force settling tortfeasors to participate in the
litigation would reduce their incentive to settle the dispute. 223 The court held that
"Tipton is properly limited to cases in which the third-party defendant is potentially
liable. 2 24 Instead of using impleader, the defendant may assert comparative fault
tortfeasor as a party, thus
as an affirmative defense without joining the settling
225
preserving the defendant's right to lay off fault.
The scope of the Wilson ruling is uncertain. There are other alleged tortfeasors
who, like the settling parties in Wilson, are not "potentially liable" to the plaintiff
and thus might share the settling tortfeasor' s freedom from Rule 1-014 joinder even
though making them parties will not discourage settlements. Tortfeasors who are
immune from liability2 2 6 or employers who are protected from common law liability

to a third person when their employees sue a third person,227 for example, are not
"potentially liable" to the injured plaintiff. Though the policy of fostering settlements will not be frustrated by allowing the joinder of these types of tortfeasors, the
substantive doctrines that free them from liability to plaintiffs might likewise be
frustrated if they can be joined as third-party defendants. Immunity sometimes
protects against the rigors of litigation as well as against liability,2 28 and the

protection of employers from most common law liability is in part motivated by
reluctance to force the employer to engage in costly lawsuits asserting common law

216. Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227,232,668 P.2d 1104, 1109 (Ct. App. 1983); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LLABIILTY § B19 cmt. k (2000) ("Because each tortfeasor is liable only for its
comparative share of the plaintiff's damages, there are no contribution claims.").
217. 105 N.M. 259, 731 P.2d 955 (Ct. App. 1986).
218. Id. at 260, 731 P.2d at 956.
219. Id. at 261,731 P.2d at 957.
220. Id. at 263, 731 P.2d at 959.
221. Id. at 262, 731 P.2d at 958 (citing Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App. 1983)).
222. Id. at 261, 731 P.2d at 957.
223. "A settling tortfeasor ought to enjoy the benefit of his settlement; joinder as a third party, after
settlement, eliminates a major benefit of settlement." Id. at 262, 731 P.2d at 958.
224. Id. at 261, 731 P.2d at 958.

225. "In this case, defendant's answer contained a sufficient statement to raise an affirmative defense, and
we see no reason why a defendant cannot raise the Bartlett defense in the same manner as other affirmative
defenses." Id. at 261, 731 P.2d at 957.
226. E.g., Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40 (1991) (finding that guardian ad litem
performing judicial function is immune from liability for negligence in failing to protect best interests of child when
approving settlement of personal injury action).
227. See NMSA 1978, § 52-1-9 (1973).
228. Carillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 614, 845 P.2d 130, 137 (1992); accord Carmona v. Hagerman
Irrigation Co., 1998-NMSC-007, 6, 957 P.2d 44, 46.
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claims. 229 If the sole test for disallowing joinder under Rule 1-014 is lack of
potential liability, sovereign immunity and the exclusivity provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act will bar sovereigns and employers from being joined. If, instead,
lack of potential liability must be accompanied by an independent policy reason for
refusing to allow a tortfeasor to be joined, the courts will have to decide whether
sovereign immunity protects against litigation as well as liability and whether
employers who cannot be sued by their employees can be made third-party defendants when a tortfeasor sued by an injured employee asserts that the employer's
negligence should reduce the tortfeasor's liability to the injured employee.
The better rule would be to preclude use of Rule 1-014 whenever the third-party
defendant has no potential liability to the plaintiff and lacks an incentive to defend
against the defendant's claim that the third-party defendant's negligence contributed
to the plaintiff's injuries.23 ° The defendant can still lay off fault by raising the
affirmative defense of the fault of the absent tortfeasor without making the tortfeasor a nominal party who, lacking an incentive to litigate, would probably default
rather than defend.
2. The "Empty Chair" Approach
Tipton permits but does not compel the defendant to use Rule 1-014 to raise the
Bartlett defense. The Tipton court suggested that a defendant may also raise the
Bartlett issue without making the other tortfeasors parties merely by asserting the
fault of others as an affirmative defense in the answer.23 ' Indeed, in Bartlett, the
court allowed the defendant to lay off fault on an alleged tortfeasor who was
unknown and thus could not be made a party to the lawsuit. 23 2 Subsequent cases

229. See Morales v. Reynolds, 2004-NMCA-098, 14, 97 P.3d 612, 617 (strictly construing exception to
general rule that employee cannot sue in a common law action against employer because to allow liberal
construction would "eviscerate the essential provisions of the Act," which is designed to protect employers from
most common law litigation). In Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689, 712 P.2d 1351 (1985), the supreme court
approved of the use of Rule 1-014 against an employer of the plaintiff but did not focus on the status of the
employer as an entity that was not potentially liable to the plaintiff.
230. This "test" adopted from Wilson v. Gillis, 105 N.M. 259,731 P.2d 955 (Ct. App. 1986), is not free from
difficulty in application. For example, a tortfeasor whose negligence will not result in liability if the defendant can
successfully assert the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations, see Rule 1-008(C) NMRA (providing that
statute of limitations is affirmative defense), is perhaps potentially liable at least until the affirmative defense is
raised and proven. See Fredenburgh v. Allied Van Lines, 79 N.M. 593, 446 P.2d 868 (1968) (providing that
affirmative defenses not pled are waived); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § B 19

cmt. e (2000) ("Persons for whom the statute of limitations bars suit should.. .be treated as immune parties.").
Occasionally, the third-party defendant will not be subject to liability but might have an incentive to
defend against a Bartlett defense. For example, a negligent employer is not potentially liable to the employeeplaintiff but has an incentive to minimize its own fault in order to maximize the amount the employee must
reimburse the employer from the employee's recovery against the defendant. See NMSA 1978, § 52-1-10.1 (2004).
Contra RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § B19 cmt. 1 (2000) (analogizing
employer who paid Workers' Compensation benefits to a settling tortfeasor, both of whom have paid only their
share to the plaintiff and neither of whom should benefit from plaintiff's recovery against third parties).
231. Tipton, 103 N.M. at 692, 712 P.2d at 1354. The court noted that the fault of others was not a listed
affirmative defense, id., but that is not determinative because Rule 1-008(C) provides that, in addition to those
specifically listed, affirmative defenses include "any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."
Rule 1-008(C) NMRA. The Uniform Jury Instructions now list the partial fault of others as an affirmative defense.
See UJI 13-302D NMRA.
232. Bartlett, 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579. The opinion in Bartlettstates that the "[d]efendant contended that
the negligence of the unknown driver 'caused or contributed to cause' the accident" but does not specify whether

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35

have allowed the use of the affirmative defense of comparative fault withoutjoinder
of the alleged tortfeasor, even when the other tortfeasors were known and could
have been brought into the lawsuit.233 In Segura v. K-Mart Corp.,2 34 for example,
the defendant alleged in its answer the fault of a non-party,235 whom the defendant
later identified as Keck.236 The trial court ruled that defendant could not lay off fault
on Keck without joining him as a third-party defendant. 237 The court of appeals
reversed, ruling that New Mexico law allowed the defendant to present an "empty
chair" Bartlett defense by asserting the affirmative defense of the fault of other
tortfeasors without joining them as parties. 238 The defendant is thus able to lay off
fault on an alleged tortfeasor who is not a party to the lawsuit, who is not
participating in the trial, and who thus has no reason to defend vigorously.
The defendant's tactical choice to raise the fault of another as an affirmative
defense without making the alleged tortfeasor a party sometimes might be satisfactory to the plaintiff as well. The plaintiff may be confident that the other alleged
tortfeasor is not liable and will not be assigned any fault. The plaintiff also might
prefer to await the outcome of the trial with the defendant and then sue the
additional wrongdoer in a separate lawsuit, if necessary, to achieve full compensation, thus avoiding the increased procedural problems that arise when additional
parties are present.239 When the plaintiff is not satisfied with the defendant's choice
of an "empty chair" defense, the plaintiff normally can amend the complaint to add
the alleged tortfeasor as a defendant, thus preventing the defendant from taking
advantage of the "empty chair" Bartlettdefense.2 4 In the rare situation in which the
non-party would prefer to be in the litigation between the plaintiff and the
defendant, the non-party can seek to intervene.24 '

the defendant made the assertion as a defense in the answer. Id. at 153, 646 P.2d at 580. With a single exception,
the Restatement would not allow a defendant to lay off fault on a tortfeasor "who is not sufficiently identified to
be either subject to service of process or discovery." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF

LlABiLrrY § B19 cmt. f (2000).
233. See, e.g., Jaramillo v. Kellogg, 1998-NMCA-142, N 13-14, 966 P.2d 792, 793; Wilson v. Gillis, 105
N.M. 259, 261,731 P.2d 955, 957 (Ct. App. 1986).
234. 2003-NMCA-013, 62 P.3d 283.
235. Id. 1 17, 62 P.3d at 288.
236. See id.
237. See id. U 19, 24, 62 P.3d at 288-89.
238. Id. The court relied on Wilson v. Gillis, 105 N.M. 259, 261,731 P.2d 955,957 (Ct. App. 1986), which
held that a defendant could lay off fault on an alleged tortfeasor who had settled with the plaintiff without joining
the settling tortfeasor.
239. For example, multiple defendants in a several liability case will almost always each get separate
peremptory jury challenges while the plaintiff's challenges will be limited. See Rule 1-038(E) NMRA; Gallegos
v. Citizens Ins. Agency, 108 N.M. 722, 734, 779 P.2d 99, 111 (1989) (listing considerations in determining the
number of peremptory challenges for each party); Sewell v. Wilson, 101 N.M. 486, 491-93, 684 P.2d 1151,
1156-58 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Apodaca v. AAAGas Co., 2003-NMCA-085, 73 P.3d 215 (holding that spouse
seeking consortium must share peremptory challenges with husband).
240. A plaintiff cannot wait too long to file the subsequent action. If the statute of limitations has run for an
action against the additional tortfeasor, plaintiffs subsequent action will be subject to dismissal. See supra note
46.
241. Rule 1-024 NMRA.
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3. Rule 1-019 Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication
The Tipton court suggested a third procedural mechanism for raising the Bartlett
issue: the defendant might assert that non-party tortfeasors should be joined in the
action in accordance with Rule 1_019.242 Commenting on the need to broadly
construe the rules to effectuate the doctrine of several liability, the court called for
liberal construction of Rules 1-019 and 1-014: "[IUt will be necessary that the rules
of third-party practice and joinder of missing parties, whether those parties be
permissive or necessary, be liberally applied when comparative fault or liability of
multiple parties surfaces in the pleadings. 2 43 No other New Mexico appellate case
has discussed the use of Rule 1-019 in this context, suggesting that it is not now a
preferred method for defendants to raise the Bartlettdefense. It nonetheless is the
most satisfactory method if properly applied.
The plaintiff initially chooses the parties to the lawsuit. 244 For tactical reasons,
the plaintiff may omit a person from the litigation who meets the Rule 1-019 criteria
forjoinder. The plaintiff must then identify the omitted person and state the reasons
for non-joinder. 245 This requirement provides the defendant with notice and an
opportunity to move to add the person as a party. It also informs the court of the
absence of such persons so that the court may notify them of the pending litigation
and invite them to intervene, 24 or move, sua sponte, to join them as parties pursuant
to Rule 1_019.247
Rule 1-019 sets criteria for determining which persons should be joined in a
pending action 248 and requires that the court join them unless procedural barriers to
joinder exist. 249 If non-parties are persons who should be joined under the rule, but
cannot be joined, the court must apply listed criteria25 ° to determine whether the
action can proceed in their absence or whether the action should be dismissed
because their presence is critical to the case.251

242. Rule 1-019 NMRA ("Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication").
243. Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689, 693, 712 P.2d 1351, 1355 (1985) (emphasis added).
244. See Rule 1-020 NMRA.
245. Rule 1-019(C) NMRA. The rule does not require the plaintiff to identify persons whose existence or
identity are unknown to the plaintiff. Id. One commentator notes that "[tihe provision has not proved useful
because of the perceived widespread failure of counsel to comply with the requirements." 4 JAMES WM. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 19.07[1] (3d ed. 1999). Any pleading asserting a claim for relief must
comply with the rule. See Rule 1-019(C) NMRA. Thus, a defendant filing a counterclaim or cross claim is subject
to the same requirement.
246. 4 MOORE Er AL., supra note 245, 1 19.07[1].
247. "The matter of a party's absence can be raised at any time and should be raised by a court sua
sponte.... We must protect the interests of an absent necessary party, and have a duty to ensure that the best possible
parties litigate this suit." United States Cellular Inv. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 124 F.3d 180, 182
(10th Cir. 1997); see Faunce v. Bird, 210 F.R.D. 725, 727 (D. Or. 2002).
248. Rule 1-019(A) NMRA.
249. Persons who meet the Rule 1-019(A) criteria "shall" be joined if "subject to service of process." Rule
1-019(A) NMRA.
250. Rule 1-019(B) NMRA. The listed factors are not the only ones that may be considered. State ex rel. Coil
v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-036, 5, 990 P.2d 1277, 1279 (stating that factors are "nonexclusive").
251. When the court concludes that the case must be dismissed because a person who should be joined
cannot be joined, the person is labeled "indispensable." If the court concludes that the action can continue even
in the absence of that person, the person is a party to be joined if feasible but not an indispensable party. See
Holguin v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., 91 N.M. 398, 575 P.2d 88 (1975), overruled inpartby C.E. Alexander
& Sons v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 112 N.M. 89, 91, 811 P.2d 899, 901 (1991).
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There are three situations in which an absentee is a party to be joined if feasible:
where complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, where the
absent person's interests may be impaired in his or her absence, and where a party
may be subjected to inconsistent obligations unless the absent person is joined.2 52
The most likely of these three to apply to several liability cases is the first, where
"in [the missing person's] absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties."25 3 If the absent person is partially liable for plaintiff' s injuries, the
plaintiff will not receive full compensation from the remaining defendants who are
only liable for their percentages of fault. Joining the missing tortfeasor as a party
would provide the possibility of complete relief, suggesting that the missing
tortfeasor is a person to be joined if feasible.254
Applying Indiana's several liability doctrine, the court held in Alvarez v.
Donaldson Co.255 that non-parties alleged by the defendant to be additional
tortfeasors were persons to be joined in order to afford complete relief to the
plaintiff.2 56 The court reasoned that "[u]nder the Indiana Comparative Fault Act,
nonparties are assessed fault but not liability. If fault were found the [plaintiff]
would be unable to recover damages from them, requiring the [plaintiff] to follow
up in [a separate action]."257
Two rationales emerge from Alvarez: first, the non-party should be joined to
afford complete relief to the plaintiff; and second, judicial efficiency is best served
by resolving all liability with all tortfeasors present in a single lawsuit. 258 There is
irony, however, in allowing the defendant to insist on the presence of a non-party
to assure complete relief to the plaintiff. The defendant has no need for Rule 1-019
to protect its own interests. It can lay off fault using either the "empty chair"
defense or joinder pursuant to Rule 1-014.259 The defendant's motion ostensibly
seeks to benefit the plaintiff by assuring that the plaintiff can collect all its damages
in a single lawsuit. But the plaintiff is master of its lawsuit and chose not to join the
absent alleged tortfeasors. The plaintiff might prefer to forego an attempt to
establish the non-party's liability. Even if the plaintiff was not aware of the
additional alleged tortfeasor until the defendant identified the alleged tortfeasor as
a person to be joined if feasible, the plaintiff has the option of amending the

252. Rule 1-0l9(A)(l)-(2) NMRA.
253. Rule 1-019(A)(1) NMRA.
254. In contrast, when tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, those not sued will not be persons to be
joined if feasible. Because the plaintiff can get complete relief from any one tortfeasor who is jointly and severally
liable, Bartlett, 98 N.M. 152 at 646 P.2d at 581 (Ct. App. 1982), the presence of non-party tortfeasors is not
necessary to afford complete relief to plaintiff. Thus, they are not persons to be joined under Rule 19(A)(1). E.g.,
Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990) ("It has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint
tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit."); see FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) advisory committee notes
("[A] tortfeasor with the usual 'joint-and-several' liability is merely a permissive party to an action against another
with like liability.").
255. 213 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2000).
256. Id. at 995.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689, 712 P.2d 1351 (1985).

Winter 2005]

BARTLETT REVISITED-PART TWO

complaint and adding the person as a defendant if the plaintiff wants to assure
complete relief. 6 °
The defendant's decision to use the Rule 1-019(A)(1) motion instead of using
Rule 1-014 to implead additional wrongdoers might be motivated by a desire to reap
a procedural benefit for itself rather than to assist the plaintiff in getting complete
relief. If the additional wrongdoer cannot be joined pursuant to Rule 1-019, the
court might find the absent party indispensable and dismiss the action against the
" ' Courts should thus be
defendant.26
particularly wary of a defendant's motion tojoin
additional parties under this provision of Rule 1-019 when the absent persons are
not subject to the court's jurisdiction.
The alternative "judicial economy" rationale for assuring complete relief byjoining all tortfeasors in a single action protects the courts from the inefficiencies of
multiple lawsuits.262 This is the strongest reason for liberal application of Rule 1019(A). The courts and the public have an "interest in the comprehensive resolution
of disputes and avoidance of duplicative litigation ' 263 that is best served by joining
all persons who have an interest in the litigation. Joinder ensures "that any relief to
be awarded will effectively and completely adjudicate the dispute. '' 264 This goal
meshes perfectly with the goal of Tipton "that all tortfeasors should be joined in the
jury's determination of apportionment of damages. 265
A missing tortfeasor would also qualify as a person to be joined if feasible if that
tortfeasor has an interest in the subject matter of the litigation and is so situated that
non-joinder "may...as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest. '266 This provision will almost never be relevant in several liability cases.
Limitations on the doctrine of collateral estoppel assure that any judgment entered
in the absence of a non-party tortfeasor will not result in a judgment against that
tortfeasor 267 and any findings of fault in the initial litigation will not be binding
upon the absent tortfeasor in subsequent litigation.26 8

260. A plaintiff may amend its complaint to add new parties but delay in doing so may subject plaintiff to
the defense of the statute of limitations when raised by the newly-joined party. E.g., Clark v. Lovelace Health Sys.,
Inc., 2004-NMCA-1 19,99 P.3d 232; see Rule 1-015(C) NMRA; Romero v. Bachicha, 2001-NMCA-048, 28 P.3d
1151.
261. E.g., Estate of Alvarez v. Donaldson Co., 213 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2000) (case dismissed because absent
severally-liable tortfeasors were both necessary and indispensable but could not be joined due to subject matter
jurisdiction limitations). The dismissal for lack of an indispensable party is not on the merits and does not prevent
plaintiff from filing in another forum where all tortfeasors can be joined in a single action. Rule 1-041(B) NMRA
(providing that dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party is not an adjudication on the merits). Even if the
statute of limitations has mn for actions against the original defendants at the time of dismissal, a New Mexico
statute allows a plaintiff to file a second lawsuit against them within six months of the dismissal. See NMSA 1978,
§ 37-1-14 (2004). It is not clear, however, whether courts of other states would honor this provision if the second
lawsuit is filed in a different state court. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (stating that forum
is free to apply its own statute of limitations in preference to any other).
262. "Ihe interests that are being furthered here are not only those of the parties, but also that of the public
in avoiding repeated lawsuits on the same essential subject matter." FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee notes.
263. 4 MOORE ET AL., supra note 245, 1 19.03[2][a].
264. Smith v. Mandel, 66 F.R.D. 405, 408 (D.S.C. 1975).
265. Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689, 693, 712 P.2d 1351, 1355 (1985).
266. Rule 1-019(A)(2)(a) NMRA.
267. "It is an elementary, if not oft-stated, principle that judgment may not be entered against one not a party
to the action." Lava Shadows Ltd. v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-043, 6, 915 P.2d 331, 332-33.
268. Only when a person was a party or in privity with a party in the initial litigation can findings in that
action be used against the person in subsequent litigation. State v. Silva, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987). For
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Only if the absent tortfeasor was also injured by the fault of a defending party
who lacks sufficient resources to satisfy both the plaintiffs and the absent
tortfeasor's claims could the absent person's interests be impaired by non-joinder.2 69
Even then, the absent party, if aware of the pending lawsuit, could seek to intervene
in the lawsuit.27 ' Thus, the absent tortfeasor would get to decide whether
participation in the litigation would best protect that tortfeasor's interests. 1
The third category of persons to be joined if feasible consists of those whose
absence would leave an existing party subject to a "substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations" by reason of the absent
person's interest in the subject of the action.272 The usual focus of this provision is
on whether the defendant in the pending action might suffer double or inconsistent
obligations in the absence of the other person. 273 Because defendants in New
274
Mexico can lay off fault on absent tortfeasors without joining them as parties,
defendants will not suffer from the absence of missing tortfeasors.2 5 Even if an
absent person also had a personal injury claim against the defendant, the defendant
this reason, the plaintiffin the original action cannot use collateral estoppel against a tortfeasor who was not a party
in the first lawsuit when suing that tortfeasor in a subsequent action.
Whether the defendant in the subsequent action can use issue preclusion against the plaintiff in the
original and subsequent action is a more complicated question. In subsequent litigation involving an absent person
who was aware of the initial lawsuit and chose not to intervene in it, the absent person probably cannot take
advantage of findings in the initial lawsuit that are unfavorable to the plaintiff. In Silva, the court stated that a
person who chose not to intervene in the initial action, and later was a plaintiffin a different action brought by a
party to the first lawsuit could not use collateral estoppel offensively against that party. Id. at 475, 745 P.2d at 383.
This ruling does not address the question of whether the result should be different when the person who could have
intervened seeks to use the results of the first lawsuit defensively in the second lawsuit. The rationale for limiting
collateral estoppel is that a person should not be encouraged to sit out the first lawsuit in order to potentially benefit
from collateral estoppel in the second lawsuit. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). This
rationale would apply equally to an absent tortfeasor who chose not to intervene as a defendant in the initial lawsuit.
Barring the defensive use of collateral estoppel by the defendant who could have intervened in the first lawsuit will
benefit the plaintiff who is then free to relitigate percentages of fault unfavorable to the plaintiff that were
established in the initial lawsuit. This would undermine one of the goals of the modem doctrine of defensive
collateral estoppel, which "gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first action if
possible." Id. at 329-30.
269. E.g., GMBB, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 100 F. Supp. 2d 465,470 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (ruling that a
party in a parallel state action seeking to recover monies under the same insurance policy as plaintiff was a
necessary party in part because insurance proceeds would be inadequate to cover inconsistent verdicts). Contra,
SMI-Owen Steel Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 199 F.R.D. 209 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
In theory, the absent tortfeasor also could have its interests impaired by the stare decisis effect of an
appellate ruling in the initial litigation that would establish a precedent for the subsequent litigation involving the
absent tortfeasor. But the decision whether the absent person should be joined in the initial litigation is made at
the trial stage, and it is then purely speculative whether there will be an appeal and whether any appeal will result
in a legal ruling that would harm the interests of the absent party. See Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard
Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 1993) (declining to rule that any potential effect the doctrine of stare decisis may
have on an absent party's rights makes the absent party'sjoinder compulsory under Rule 19(a) whenever feasible).
270. Rule 1-024 NMRA.
271. When "the outsider does not actively assert his or her interest by seeking to join or intervene," the court
is less likely to find that joinder is required to protect that person's interests. 25 FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYER'S
EDmON § 59:102, at 435 (2001).
272. Rule 1-019(A)(2)(b) NMRA.
273. "[A]ny harm to the plaintiff caused by its structuring of the litigation is self-inflicted. Thus, such
potential harm to the plaintiff is rarely relevant." 4 MOORE ET AL., supranote 245, 1 19.03[4][a].
274. E.g., Jaramillo v. Kellogg, 1998-NMCA-142, 1, 966 P.2d 792, 793.
275. In Wilson v. Gillis, 105 N.M. 259,731 P.2d 955 (Ct. App. 1986) the defendant argued that the absence
of the other tortfeasor would impair the defendant's ability to do full discovery and might confuse the jury. The
court rejected both arguments. Id. at 262, 731 P.2d at 958.
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would not suffer the type of harm contemplated by this section. Differences in
liability of a defendant to different persons for separate injuries cannot result in the
type of multiple liability required to satisfy this section. 276 Although the defendant's
percentage of assessed fault may differ in the first case from that established in a
later case brought by the absent person, this is not the type of inconsistency that the
rule contemplates: "The rule protects against obligations that are inconsistent rather
than adjudications that are inconsistent....Rule 19 is not triggered by the possibility
of a subsequent adjudication
that may result in a judgment that is inconsistent as a
277
matter of logic."
f the absent tortfeasor is to be joined if feasible and is subject to the court's
jurisdiction, the court will order the person's joinder. 278 if the person cannot be
joined, as for example if the alleged tortfeasor is not subject to personal jurisdiction
or is immune from suit, 279 the court must decide whether to proceed in the person's
280
absence or to dismiss the lawsuit in accordance with guidelines in Rule 1-01 9(B).
If the court concludes that the non-party who cannot be joined is so important that,
in its absence, the case should not go forward, the non-party is deemed
indispensable and the case is dismissed. 28' The court may conclude, however, that
the action may proceed in the person's absence, in which case the absent tortfeasor,
though a person to be joined if feasible, is not an indispensable party.282
4. Raising the BartlettDefense: A Proposal
For tactical reasons, the defendant may prefer one of the three alternatives over
another to raise the Bartlettdefense. But from ajurisprudential and procedural point
of view, the best method is that least used to date-Rule 1-019. Asserting Bartlett
only as an affirmative defense results in the "empty chair" phenomenon, in which
the defendant casts fault on a person who is not present to respond, while the
plaintiff takes on the defense of the absent person in order to maximize the liability
of the defendant. This can cause confusion for the jury283 and unfairness to the

276. Moody v. Stribling, 1999-NMCA-094, 24, 985 P.2d 1210, 1217-18.
277. RPR & Assocs. v. O'Brien/Atkins Assocs., 921 F. Supp. 1457, 1464 (M.D.N.C. 1995); 25 FEDERAL
PROCEDURE: LAWYER'S EDmON § 59:104, at 438 (2001) (stating that the rule protects against "inconsistent
obligations, as where there would be two court orders and compliance with one might breach the other").
278. See Rule 1-019(A)(2)(b) NMRA.
279. E.g., Srader v. Verant, 1998-NMSC-025, 28, 964 P.2d 82, 90 (stating that Indian governments are
immune from most suits in state court).
280. Rule 1-019(B) NMRA; see, e.g., Srader, 1998-NMSC-025, IN 30-39, 964 P.2d at 90-92 (applying
criteria for determining whether to dismiss due to inability to join an entity that should be joined if feasible).
281. "[D]eeming a party 'indispensable' is a conclusion the court reaches after weighing various factors,"
including those in Rule 1-019(B). Holguin v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., 91 N.M. 398, 575 P.2d 88 (1975),
overruled in part by C.E. Alexander & Sons v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 112 N.M. 89, 91, 811 P.2d 899, 901 (1991).
282. When "persons to be joined if feasible" were labeled "necessary parties" in earlier versions of Rule 1019, see 25 FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYER'S EDrnON § 59:97, at 428 (2001), New Mexico erroneously equated
"necessary" and "indispensable" parties. Sellman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391,400, 310 P.2d 1045,1051 (1957). The
New Mexico Supreme Court has broken that link, acknowledging that "deeming a party 'indispensable' is a
conclusion the court reaches after weighing various factors," rather than automatically concluding that persons who
should be joined if feasible are inevitably indispensable parties. Holguin, 91 N.M. at 401, 575 P.2d at 91.
283. The plaintiff is put in the position of defending against a claim that the non-party is at fault, while the
jury would expect that a plaintiff should be trying to prove the fault of all tortfeasors who caused injury to the
plaintiff. The court of appeals has rejected this argument. Wilson v. Gillis, 105 N.M. 259,262, 731 P.2d 955,958
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parties.284 Moreover, the absence of the alleged tortfeasor means that additional
litigation will occur if the plaintiff later decides to sue the absent party after
achieving disappointing results in the initial action brought in that tortfeasor's
absence.
Rule 1-014 impleader is more satisfactory than the "empty chair" affirmative
defense, though it has serious flaws. The advantage is that the defendant both
identifies additional wrongdoers and makes them parties to the lawsuit. 285 The
disadvantage is that the alleged tortfeasor becomes a party, but lacks incentive to
appear and defend because the defendant seeks only to lay off fault rather than to
obtain affirmative relief. 28 6 Only if the plaintiff chooses287 to amend the complaint
to add the third-party defendant as a defendant in the plaintiff's action is there a
clear incentive for the third-party defendant to present a defense.288
The use of Rule 1-019 prevents the "empty chair" defense and assures that the
absent person, once brought into the lawsuit, will have motivation to defend. Rule
1-019 brings additional benefits as well. The plaintiff, as a party asserting a claim
for relief, must identify by name, if known, any person who should be joined as a
party if feasible but who was not joined, and must explain why the person was not
joined. 289 This requirement saves the defendant the time and expense of searching
for such persons and provides the defendant with an early opportunity to request
their joinder.29 ° Once the persons who should be joined if feasible are identified,
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has the final say as to whether they are made
parties. Instead, the court "shall" order that they be made parties. 29 ' The court also

(Ct. App. 1987). The court's view is that juries possess "significant abilities and talents.. .to carefully sift through
conflicting positions and ascertain the true facts." Id. at 262, 731 P.2d at 958.
284. Many discovery devices are only available against a party. E.g., Rule 1-033 NMRA (interrogatories);
Rule 1-034 NMRA (requests for production); Rule 1-035 NMRA (physical examination); Rule 1-036 NMRA
(requests for admissions). The court of appeals rejected this claim of unfairness, finding that the depositions and
subpoenas duces tecum that are available against non-parties provide sufficient opportunities for discovery. Wilson,
105 N.M. at 262, 731 P.2d at 958.
285. See supra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 215-217 and accompanying text.
287. A plaintiff is under no obligation to file a claim against the third-party defendant and preclusion
doctrines will not prevent a plaintiff from proceeding against the third-party defendant in a separate action. 3
MOORE ET AL., supra note 245, 14.0613].
288. There is a slight possibility that the third-party defendant will be subject to liability to the plaintiff even
if the plaintiff does not move to amend the complaint before trial to add the third-party defendant as a defendant.
Even if the plaintiff does not formally amend to add the third-party defendant as a defendant in the plaintiffs
action, if all the parties actually litigate the issue of the third-party defendant's liability and the third-party
defendant is not prejudiced in its defense, the court might conclude that the pleadings had been amended by
implied consent of the parties pursuant to Rule 1-015(B). See, e.g., Jack Frost, Inc. v. Engineered Bldg.
Components Co., 304 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 1981); Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970).
289. Rule 1-019(C) NMRA.
290. The defendant may make a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs lawsuit for failure to join a person who
should be joined if feasible or can include the defense in its answer. Rule 1-012(B)(7) NMRA. If the defendant
asserts that the absent party is indispensable to the continuation of the lawsuit, the defendant can make that motion
at any time, including at the trial on the merits, Rule 1-012(H)(2) NMRA, or for the first time on appeal. E.g., C.E.
Alexander & Sons, Inc. v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 112 N.M. 89, 811 P.2d 899 (1991). Though normally framed as a motion
to dismiss, the appropriate remedy is for the court to order joinder of the person rather than dismissal of the case.
Rule l-019(A)(2)(b) NMRA ("If [the person] has not been sojoined, the court shall order that [the person] be made
a party."); e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers Union No. 63 v. Glaziers Local Union
No. 27, 40 F. Supp. 2d 997 (N.D. III. 1999); English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 465 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1972).
291. Rule 1-019(A)(2)(b) NMRA.
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can raise the issue of necessary parties sua sponte 29 2 and can order the joinder of
parties on its own initiative at any stage of the proceedings. 29 3 Rule 1-019 thus
enhances the power of the court to configure the lawsuit in the most efficient
manner rather than leaving entirely to the parties the final decision on whether to
bring all alleged tortfeasors into the lawsuit.
Despite these benefits, there are potential problems with the use of Rule 1-0 19.
First, the mandatory nature of the rule calling for joinder of persons diminishes the
court's flexibility to omit marginal parties-those who may be tortfeasors but who
are so unlikely to be held liable that the plaintiff chose not to join them. 29 a The
result could be bulky multiple-party litigation of doubtful benefit to the judicial
system or to the parties to the lawsuit.295
In addition, some tortfeasors may lack any incentive to participate actively in the
litigation if made parties to the lawsuit pursuant to Rule 1-019 just as they may lack
incentive if joined pursuant to Rule 1-014. Immune tortfeasors,296 negligent
employers who are protected from common law liability to their employees, 297 and
persons who have already settled with the plaintiff 9 8 will add little to the litigation
process because they cannot be held liable to the plaintiff. These persons should not
qualify as persons to be joined if feasible. The plaintiff can obtain all the relief the
law allows without their presence, and their interests cannot be impaired by their
absence because they are not liable to the plaintiff.
Nor would the interests of the named and joined defendants suffer due to the
absence of immune tortfeasors, because defendants could still lay off fault on them
withoutjoining them as parties under Rule 1-019. As long as defendants are allowed
to raise the fault of absent tortfeasors as an affirmative defense withoutjoining them
as parties, defendants' interests will be protected. 299 In Wilson v. Gillis,3°° the
defendant sought to implead an absent tortfeasor who had settled with the plaintiff
and thus had no incentive to litigate if made a party.3 ' The court of appeals held

292. NLRB v. Doug Neal Mgmt. Co., 620 F.2d 1133 (6th Cir. 1980); Centamore v. Comm'r, Dep't of
Human Servs., 634 A.2d 950, 951-52 (Me. 1993).
293. Rule 1-021 NMRA.
294. Nothing in Rule 1-019 grants the court authority to forego non-joinder of a person needed to afford
complete relief who can be joined merely because that person's liability is not clear. See Rule 1-019(A)(2)(b)
NMRA; Hodgson v. Sch. Bd., New Kensington-Arnold Sch. Dist., 56 F.R.D. 393, 394 (W.D. Pa. 1972). Where,

however, the ground for joinder is that the non-party has an interest in the litigation that may be impaired in its
absence, the non-party can disclaim the interest and thus avoid joinder. E.g., Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317
F.3d 954, 971 (9th Cir. 2002); Amico v. New Castle County, 571 F. Supp. 160, 165-66 (D. Del. 1983).
295. In Estate ofAlvarez v. Donaldson Co., 213 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2000), the defendant successfully argued

that forty-eight additional defendants should be joined in a tort action because each allegedly was partially liable
to plaintiff under the Indiana law of several liability. Id. at 995.
296. See, e.g., Collins v. Tabet, 1 I I N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40 (1991) (in legal malpractice action alleging poor
settlement of minor's action, guardian ad litem may be immune from liability even though any fault of guardian
ad litem may reduce the liability of the defendant).
297. NMSA 1978, § 52-1-9 (1973); see Morales v. Reynolds, 2004-NMCA-098, 97 P.3d 612.
298. See, e.g., Wilson v. Gillis, 105 N.M. 259, 731 P.2d 955 (Ct. App. 1986).
299. See generally Tipton, 103 N.M. at 692-93, 712 P.2d at 1354-55 (discussing alternative means for
raising the Bartlett defense).
300. 105 N.M. 259,731 P.2d 955 (Ct. App. 1986).
301. In a several liability action, once the tortfeasor settles with the plaintiff, the tortfeasor cannot be liable
to the plaintiff and is not liable for contribution or common law indemnity to other tortfeasors. Wilson, 105 N.M.
at 261, 731 P.2d at 957.
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that it made no sense to allow impleader of the settling tortfeasor and authorized an
"empty chair" affirmative defense as an alternative. 2 Tojoin the settling tortfeasor
as a party would discourage settlements,a°3 just as to join immune tortfeasors would
undercut one purpose of the grant of immunity-protection of the tortfeasor from
the necessity of defending lawsuits when the tortfeasor is immune from liability. 3"
The Tipton rationale allowing joinder "is properly limited to cases in which the
3 5 to the plaintiff. The same rationale
third-party defendant is potentially liable""
applies to joinder under Rule 1-019 of persons who cannot be held liable to the
plaintiff, and, thus, joinder of such tortfeasors should not be required.
When alleged tortfeasors should bej oined but cannot be because of'jurisdictional
problems, courts should avoid an overly rigid application of the factors used to
determine whether to dismiss the action for lack of an indispensable party. Rule 1019 works best when it results in the continuation of the pending action with all
alleged tortfeasors present. Courts should be hesitant to dismiss an action for lack
of an indispensable party in several liability cases. When an alternative forum is
available in which the plaintiff can sue all tortfeasors, the court must balance the
goal of having all wrongdoers in a single lawsuit in the alternative forum3° against
the inconvenience and tactical difficulties that confront a plaintiff who is deprived
of its preferred forum.3" 7 Also relevant is the probable absence of prejudice to the
unjoinable tortfeasor who is not likely to be bound by preclusion principles if the
lawsuit proceeds.30"
In determining whether to dismiss or continue the lawsuit in the tortfeasor's
absence, the court must consider if there are ways to diminish the prejudice to the
other defendants if the absent tortfeasor is not made a party and the action
proceeds.309 An obvious means for preventing prejudice to the remaining defendants
exists: the court can permit the defendants to raise the "empty chair" defense when
joinder of the additional tortfeasor is not feasible.310 Though the "empty chair"

302. Id. at 261, 731 P.2d at 957.
303. Id. at 262, 731 P.2d at 958.
304. See, e.g., Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607,845 P.2d 130 (1992) (distinguishing immunity from liability
and immunity from suit). When there is no possibility that the absent tortfeasor will be held liable, as is true when
the tortfeasor has settled, has sovereign immunity, or has statutory immunity, it would undermine one purpose of
the grant of immunity to subject the tortfeasor to the litigation process.
305. Wilson, 105 N.M. at 262, 731 P.2d at 958.
306. See Tipton, 103 N.M. at 693, 712 P.2d at 1355.
307. Explaining why the trial court should be hesitant to grant a dismissal for forum non conveniens, the
supreme court stated that
the court's intervention in the management of litigation should not interfere with a party's
legitimate choice of tactics designed to persuade the fact finder. Venue is the legitimate choice
of the plaintiff who has the burden of proof... .Forum-non-conveniens considerations turn not
on the existence of advantageous choices, but on the illegitimate or unreasonable impact those
choices have on a fair trial-on the ends of justice.
Pierce v. Albertson's Inc., 1996-NMSC-009, 15,911 P.2d 877, 882. The same considerations should inform the
decision whether to deprive the plaintiff of its choice of forum when dismissal is sought on the ground that an
absent tortfeasor is not only a party to be joined if feasible, but is also indispensable to the litigation.
308. See Occhialino, supra note 22.
309. Rule 1-019(B) NMRA.
310. E.g., Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982) (unknown
tortfeasor). When a settling party's percentage of fault will be determined by the factfinder in its absence, "the
defendant will not incur any prejudice" resulting from the absence of the tortfeasor as a party. Wilson, 105 N.M.
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defense is less satisfactory than joinder of the non-party tortfeasor, New Mexico's
appellate courts approve of its use,3 1' and it can continue to serve as a second-best
alternative.
Where there is no alternative forum in which all tortfeasors can be joined as
defendants, courts should be especially hesitant to declare the absent tortfeasor an
indispensable party and to dismiss the lawsuit.3 12 A plaintiff's constitutional right
of access to courts 31 3 is compromised when a court dismisses an action for lack of
an indispensable party and there is no other forum available in which to sue all the
tortfeasors. The New Mexico Supreme Court has not always acknowledged this
basic proposition. For example, Indian tribes and pueblos are usually immune from
lawsuits in state court.31 4 The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that whenever
an immune Indian tribe or pueblo is an entity to be joined if feasible, it is not only
a necessary party but also an indispensable party. 315 The court acknowledged that
the resulting dismissal of the lawsuit might leave the plaintiff without a remedy but
ruled that the absence of an adequate remedy in another forum was not a sufficient
reason to allow the action to proceed in the Tribe's absence. 316 This absolutist
reasoning does not take into account the plaintiffs right to access to a court for
relief. It also is inconsistent with the court's view that the indispensability decision
is a factual question involving a functional analysis of the Rule 1-019(B) factors and
that the trial court exercises considerable discretion in making the decision.3 7
Beginning with Bartlett itself, New Mexico courts have allowed a lawsuit to
proceed in the absence of some tortfeasors who cannot be joined. 1 8 Recognition
that all tortfeasors should be joined if feasible pursuant to Rule 1-019(A) should not
be transformed into a command to dismiss any action where joinder is not feasible.
To do so would effectively resurrect New Mexico's discredited practice of equating

at 263, 731 P.2d at 959. The court rejected the argument that the defendants would suffer prejudice because less
discovery is available against a non-party and because a jury might be confused by the fact that the plaintiff would
be taking the side of the absent tortfeasor in order to maximize the fault of the defendants. Id. at 262, 731 P.2d at
958.
311. See Tipton, 103 N.M. at 692, 712 P.2d at 1354; Bartlett, 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579.
312. "[Ilf no remedy in an alternative forum exists, the action probably should not be dismissed even though
other factors tend to indicate that dismissal would be appropriate." 25 FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYER'S EDITION
§ 59:119, at 454 (2001).
313. See Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 763 P.2d 1153 (1988), overruled on
other grounds by Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, 965 P.2d 305.
314. State ex rel. Coil v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-036, 4, 990 P.2d 1277, 1279; Srader v. Verant, 1998NMSC-025, 29, 964 P.2d 82, 91.
315. "As a matter of public policy, the public interest in protecting tribal sovereign immunity surpasses a
plaintiffs [sic] interest in having an available forum for suit." Srader, 1998-NMSC-025, 33, 964 P.2d at 91; see
also Washoe Tribe v. Brooks, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1259 (D. Nev. 2001) (United States was immune from
liability and was held to be an indispensable party even though no alternative forum was available to the plaintiff).
316. "[T]he adequacy of remedy remaining for the Plaintiffs in the event of dismissal provides no basis for
permitting this case to proceed without the tribes." Srader, 1998-NMSC-025, 33, 964 P.2d at 91.
317. See id. I 29-31,964 P.2d at 91; State ex rel. Blanchard v. City Comm'rs, 106 N.M. 769,770,750 P.2d
469, 470 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating that Rule 1-019 determinations are guided by the "context of the particular
litigation").
318. See Bartlett, 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (holding that the jury should consider the negligence of the
unknown driver).
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"necessary" and "indispensable" parties319 when applying Rule 1-019 in several
liability cases.
The best of the three methods approved in Tipton for defendants to raise the
Bartlett defense is Rule 1-019. Liberal application of the criteria for determining
that absent tortfeasors should be joined if feasible3 20 fulfills the supreme court's
goal that "all tortfeasors should be joined in the jury's determination of
apportionment of damages... as parties to the action if they are known, within the
court's jurisdiction, and can be served... [even if] plaintiff has elected not to join
them. 3 21 When some tortfeasors cannot be joined or will choose not to participate
in the proceedings if joined,32 2 courts should normally permit the defendant to raise
the Bartlettdefense as an affirmative defense and should proceed to apportion fault
among all tortfeasors, including those who were not made parties to the action. Only
where there is a convenient alternative forum in which all tortfeasors can be made
parties should the court dismiss an action because it was unable to join a severallyliable tortfeasor in the plaintiff's lawsuit.
5. The Burden of Pleading the Fault of Others
323
The defendant's answer to the complaint should raise the affirmative defense
that the fault of others contributed to the plaintiffs injuries even when the
defendant plans to implead other tortfeasors or to seek theirjoinder pursuant to Rule
1_019.324 Merely pleading the fault of unidentified others, however, does not assure
the right to present evidence of the fault of specific other persons. In Fahrbachv.
Diamond Shamrock, Inc.,325 the plaintiff sued several defendants including
Petrolane.326 Petrolane's answer contained the generic affirmative defense of the
fault of "others" without specifying who the other tortfeasors were.327 From the
pleadings and Petrolane's responses to discovery, plaintiff was under the impression
that Petrolane and Suburban Propane were a single entity. 328 This impression was

319. Sellman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391, 402, 310 P.2d 1045, 1052-53 (1957), overruledon othergrounds
by Safeco Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 101 N.M. 148,679 P.2d 816 (1984). In Holguin v. Elephant
Butte IrrigationDistrict,91 N.M. 398,401,575 P.2d 88, 91 (1977), overruled in parton other grounds by C.E.
Alexander & Sons v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 112 N.M. 89, 91, 811 P.2d 899, 901 (1991), the court acknowledged that a
Rule 1-019 determination that a party is indispensable "is a conclusion the court reaches after weighing various
factors [and] ... after a careful and thoughtful analysis as to whether it is feasible to proceed."
320. "[lt will be necessary that the rules of.. joinder of missing parties, whether those parties be permissive
or necessary, be liberally applied when comparative fault or liability of multiple parties surfaces in the pleadings."
Tipton, 103 N.M. at 693, 712 P.2d at 1354.
321. Id. at 693, 712 P.2d at 1355.
322. Persons who are immune from liability to the plaintiff, or have settled with the plaintiff, or who, because
of a lack of assets, are judgment proof, will likely default rather than actively participate in the proceedings if made
a party.
323. Rule 1-008(C) does not list several liability as an affirmative defense but, after listing specific
affirmative defenses, states that the party shall also allege "any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense." Rule 1-008(C) NMRA. The supreme court has suggested that the Bartlettdefense is properly raised as
an affirmative defense, Tipton, 103 N.M. at 693, 712 P.2d at 1355, and the Uniform Jury Instructions list the fault
of others as an affirmative defense. UJI 13-302D NMRA.
324. See supra note 207.
325. 1996-NMSC-063,928 P.2d 269.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 272.
328. Id. at 276.
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bolstered when Petrolane did not ask that the pretrial order list Suburban Propane
as a non-party whose fault was to be litigated.329 At trial, plaintiff introduced
evidence of the fault of certain employees for the purpose of showing the fault of
Petrolane. 3 ' The employees were actually in the employ of Suburban Propane.33 '
At the close of the evidence, the trial court granted the motion of Petrolane33to2 place
Suburban Propane on the special verdict form for apportionment of fault.
The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the fault of Suburban Propane should
not have been before the jury.333 The court focused on "whether Plaintiffs had
sufficient notice... that Suburban Propane would be an entity against whom
Defendants might assert comparative fault., 334 The court noted that the answer
contained only general language attributing fault to "others," and that the pretrial
order also failed to identify Suburban Propane by name. 335 Because the pretrial
order controls the issues that will be considered at trial,336 the supreme court concluded that Petrolane's failure to identify Suburban Propane as a non-party tortfeasor in the answer or the pretrial order led the plaintiffs to expect that its
negligence would not be an issue at trial.337
The lesson for defendants is clear. The generic affirmative defense of the fault
of "others" does not provide carte blanche for the defendant to try the issue of the
negligence of all other non-parties who might have played a role in causing the
plaintiffs injuries. To the contrary, at the time of the final pretrial order,338 or at
some time sufficiently before trial to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to prepare
a defense,339 the defendant must provide details concerning the identity of the
additional tortfeasors upon whom it will seek to lay off fault at trial. If, as in
Fahrbach,the tortfeasor's identity is known, it must be divulged. In the case 3of
40
alleged tortfeasors whose identify cannot be ascertained, as occurred in Bartlett,
the court should obligate the defendant to provide as much identifying information

329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 272.
333. Id. at 278.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 272. Fahrbachcan be contrasted with Segura v. K-Mart Corp., 2003-NMCA-013, 62 P.3d 283,
in which the plaintiff unsuccessfully asserted that the defendant did not adequately raise the Bartlettdefense. In
Segura, the court of appeals ruled that K-Mart had sufficiently presented the Bartlett defense when it "clearly
raised" the issue of Keck's fault in its pleadings even though it did not join Keck as a third-party defendant. Id.
17, 62 P.3d at 288.
336. Rule 1-016(E) NMRA. A final pretrial order may be amended "only to prevent manifest injustice." Id.
337. The court further concluded that the plaintiffs did not try the issue without objection at trial and, thus,
the rule allowing for amendments to conform to the evidence was not applicable. 1996-NMSC-063, 928 P.2d at
277. Despite this ruling, the supreme court affirmed the jury verdict for the defendants. The court reasoned that,
because the jury found none of the defendants negligent, it was immaterial that the verdict form authorized laying
off fault on Suburban Propane. d. at 278.
338. See Rule 1-016(D)-(E) NMRA.
339. Rule 1-016 does not compel the court to hold a pretrial conference, see Rule 1-016(A) NMRA, so there
may not be a final pretrial conference. In the absence of a final pretrial conference, the logic of Fahrbachsuggests
that the defendant should fulfill the requirement of putting the plaintiff on notice of the persons upon whom the
defendant will seek to lay off fault at some reasonable time before trial, probably before discovery is closed.
340. Bartlett, 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982).
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as is reasonably available, and a description of the allegedly negligent conduct of
the alleged tortfeasor.34 '
Missing from Fahrbach is any discussion of whether the plaintiff has an
independent obligation to ascertain the identity of the tortfeasors upon whom the
defendant will seek to lay off fault and the conduct that allegedly constitutes their
negligence. Defendants are unlikely to volunteer this information early in the
litigation process and New Mexico's liberal pleading rules 42 do not require
defendants to divulge this information in the answer. The plaintiff who first learns
the names of the non-party alleged tortfeasors only at the final pretrial conference
or at trial risks the possibility that the statute of limitations will have run on an
action by plaintiff against the late-identified alleged tortfeasors, or that there will
be little or no time or opportunity for discovery to rebut the defendant's claim that
the non-party was negligent.343
A plaintiff should aggressively conduct discovery to learn early in the proceedings the identity of the "others" referred to in the defendant's generic affirmative
defense. Upon receiving the defendant's answer, the plaintiff should serve the
defendant with an interrogatory 3 " or schedule a deposition 34 to learn the identity
of each person that the defendant intends to include in the affirmative defense and
the specific acts of negligence that the defendant asserts each non-party tortfeasor
committed.34 6 If the defendant declines to answer because it lacks sufficient
information pending further discovery,347 the plaintiff might rely on the rule binding
defendants to "reasonably" supplement discovery responses as further discovery
takes place.348 Those less trusting of the defendant's construction of the rule calling
for unsolicited supplementation may make periodic requests for supplementary
responses3 49 or may seek a court order that the defendant supplement responses by
a given date.35 0 However accomplished, it is imperative that the plaintiff force the

341. See Segura v. K-Mart Corp., 2003-NMCA-013, 62 P.3d 283 (finding that defendant had sufficiently
identified the conduct that constituted negligence by the non-party tortfeasor).
342. E.g., Schwartzman v. Schwartzman Packing Co., 99 N.M. 436,440,659 P.2d 888,892 (1983) (pleading
asserting affirmative defenses liberally construed). See generallyLas Luminarias of the N.M. Council of the Blind
v. Isengard, 92 N.M. 297, 300, 587 P.2d 444, 447 (Ct. App. 1978) (stating that pleadings should be liberally
construed).
343. See supra notes 27-50 and accompanying text.
344. Interrogatories may be served on a defendant at any time after service of the summons and complaint
on the defendant. Rule 1-033(B) NMRA. The normal time for responding to interrogatories is thirty days after they
are served, but when the plaintiff serves the interrogatories with the summons and complaint, the defendant has
forty-five days to respond to the interrogatories. Rule 1-033(C)(3) NMRA.
345. Unless the court allows otherwise, a plaintiff must normally wait thirty days after service of the
summons and complaint on the defendant before taking a deposition. Rule 1-030(A) NMRA.
346. The plaintiff may obtain discovery of matters relevant to the defense of any party. Rule 1-026(B)(1)
NMRA.
347. See Rule 1-008(B) NMRA (allowing this response in pleadings).
348. The party responding to discovery has a duty to supplement earlier responses when "the party knows
that the response though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend
the response is in substance a knowing concealment." Rule 1-026(E)(2)(b) NMRA; see Alired v. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of N.M., 1997-NMCA-070, 943 P.2d 579 (stating that failure to comply with duty to supplement
answers to interrogatories can lead to sanctions pursuant to Rule 1-037).
349. See, e.g., Shamalon Bird Farm, Ltd. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 111 N.M. 713, 809 P.2d 627
(1991) (stating that party filed interrogatory asking that plaintiff supplement answers to all previous interrogatories).
350. See Rule 1-026(E)(3) NMRA.
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defendant to divulge the identities or, if the identities are not known, the
descriptions of the alleged additional tortfeasors so that the plaintiff may join them
as defendants or prepare to rebut the defendant's attempt to diminish its own
liability by laying off fault on the non-parties.
6. The Burden of Proof of the Fault of Others
The plaintiff who sues only one tortfeasor will assert that the defendant is wholly
liable for the plaintiff s injuries.3 5' The defendant who asserts that other tortfeasors
contributed to the plaintiff s injuries must raise the affirmative defense of the fault
of others.352 As with other affirmative defenses, the defendant has the burden of
proof that the fault of another was a contributing cause of the plaintiff s injuries.353
To satisfy this burden, the defendant must prove that (1) the other person owed a
duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) the other person breached that duty of care, and (3)
the breach of duty proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.354
The plaintiff should challenge the sufficiency of the defendant's Bartlettdefense
early in the proceedings. If the defense survives challenge, the plaintiff may choose
to amend the pleadings to add the non-party alleged to be a tortfeasor as a codefendant in order to assure complete recovery. The procedural means for
challenging the Bartlettdefense is a combination of two motions. The plaintiff can
make a motion to strike the defense as insufficient3 55 and can then seek a partial
summary judgment356 to that effect. Rule 1-012(F) states that the plaintiff must
make the motion to strike within thirty days of service of the answer. 357 Despite this
time limit, the court can strike an inadequate defense at any time,358 and courts have
construed this power to allow a court to rule on motions to strike filed by a plaintiff
after the time provided in the rule. 359 Thus, if the plaintiff needs time to conduct
discovery to determine the identity and to assess the culpability of additional

351. This assertion may be premised on the belief that one of the exceptions to the general rule eliminating
joint and several liability applies, making the defendant wholly liable despite the presence of other tortfeasors. See
NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-1(C) (1987) (four statutory exceptions); Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 120 N.M. 422,
902 P.2d 1025 (1995) (successive tortfeasor exception). Alternatively, the plaintiff may be alleging that the
defendant is fully liable because the plaintiff believes that the defendant is the only tortfeasor whose conduct
contributed to plaintiffs injuries.
352. Though the rules of civil procedure do not expressly list several liability as an affirmative defense, the
applicable rule is broad enough to encompass several liability. Rule 1-008(C) NMRA (providing the general
category of "any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense" in a list of affirmative defenses).
Cases refer to the matter as an affirmative defense. E.g., Wilson v. Gillis, 105 N.M. 259, 261, 731 P.2d 955, 957
(Ct. App. 1986). The Uniform Jury Instructions list the comparative fault of others as illustrative of an affirmative
defense, UJI 13-302C NMRA, and the Several Liability Act provides that the defendant must establish that the fault
of another is a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury in order to lay off fault on another tortfeasor. NMSA 1978,
§ 41-3A-1(B) (1987).
353. UJI 13-302D NMRA.
354. Jaramillo v. Kellogg, 1998-NMCA-142, 7, 966 P.2d 792, 794.
355. Rule 1-012(F) NMRA.
356. Rule 1-056(C) NMRA.
357. Rule 1-012(F) NMRA.
358. Id.
359. Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc. v. Veneglia, No. 94-CV-1400, 1997 WL135946, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.
18, 1997); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 728 F. Supp. 192, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); FDIC v. BritishAmerican Corp., 744 F. Supp. 116, 117 (E.D.N.C. 1990); Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 158, 161
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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tortfeasors, the court can entertain a motion to strike the defense after discovery is
complete.
The motion to strike an inadequate defense is normally resolved on the pleadings
as a matter of law3" and thus would not, by itself, be an effective tool for a plaintiff
to assert that, though the pleading was proper, the court should strike the defense
for lack of evidence to support the claim that the non-party is partially liable for the
plaintiffs injuries. Unlike other Rule 1-012 motions, 36 ' there is no provision
explicitly permitting transformation of the motion to strike into a summary
judgment motion. Nonetheless, courts often allow the parties to introduce materials
outside the pleadings in conjunction with Rule 1-012 motions and have treated the
motion to strike an inadequate defense as one for partial summary judgment.3 62 In
Segura v. K-Mart Corp.,363 for example, the plaintiff and court dealt with a motion
to strike the Bartlett defense as a motion for partial summary judgment and the
parties introduced
information outside the pleadings in support of their respective
positions. 36
The normal rules apply when testing the sufficiency of the Bartlettdefense. 365 To
establish medical negligence, for example, a party usually must present evidence in
the form of expert testimony setting the professional standard of care and
demonstrating that the alleged tortfeasor failed to meet the standard.36 6 In Jaramillo
v. Kellogg, 367 the defendant asserted that a non-party physician was guilty of
negligence contributing to the plaintiff s injury, but the defendant failed to present
the requisite expert testimony at trial.368 The court of appeals affirmed a trial court
ruling that the defendant's failure to introduce expert testimony justified the court's
refusal to place the issue of the alleged tortfeasor's fault on the special verdict
360. County Vanlines Inc. v. Experian info. Solutions, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 148, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Krauss
v. Keibler-Thompson Corp., 72 F.R.D. 615, 617 (D. Del. 1976).
361. See Rule 1-012(B) NMRA (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Rule 1-012(C) NMRA
(motion for judgment on the pleadings).
362. E.g., Marco Holding Co. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204,213 (N.D. nl. 1985); United States v.
Windward Props., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 690, 697 (N.D. Ga. 1993), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Banks, 115 F.3d 916, 919 (1 th Cir. 1997); Thy Tran v. Avis Rent A Car Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 662, 663--64 (App.
Div. 2001) (affirming grant of motion for partial summary judgment striking affirmative defense of comparative
negligence); Dangerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373, 377 (N.D. 1974).
363. 2003-NMCA-013, 62 P.3d 283.
364. Id. 4, 62 P.3d at 285.
365. In some of the cases discussed in this section, the issue was the sufficiency of the evidence at trial to
support placing a non-party on the special verdict form on which the jury allocated fault rather than the sufficiency
of the evidence to overcome a summary judgment motion. Jaramillo v. Kellogg, 1998-NMCA-142,1 5,966 P.2d
792, 794; see Bowman v. County of Los Alamos, 102 N.M. 660, 662-63, 699 P.2d 133, 135-36 (Ct. App. 1985).
If the tests are the same, these cases are directly applicable to the summary judgment discussion that follows. If the
tests are not exactly the same, the cases nonetheless provide assistance in determining the proof required at the
summary judgment stage to strike the defense of the fault of others. New Mexico has not definitively decided
whether the test for granting a summary judgment is the same as the test for granting a directed verdict. See
Christopher David Lee, Note, Summary Judgment in New Mexico Following Bartlett v. Mirabal, 33 N.M. L. REV.
503 (2003). Compare Blauwkamp v. Univ. of N.M. Hosp., 114 N.M. 228, 836 P.2d 1249 (Ct. App. 1992), with
Bartlett v. Mirabal, 2000-NMCA-036, 999 P.2d 1062 (disagreeing on whether standard for directed verdict is the
same as standard for the grant of summary judgment).
366. UJI 13-1101 NMRA. An expert is not necessary when the negligence of the physician is so obvious that
a lay jury can perceive the breach of duty. Pharmaseal Labs., Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 758, 568 P.2d 589, 594
(1977) (discussing a "common knowledge" exception to expert witness rule).
367. 1998-NMCA-142,966 P.2d 792.
368. Id. 1 9, 966 P.2d at 794.
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The Jaramillocourt did not limit its opinion to cases in which required
expert testimony was absent, broadly declaring that "[g]eneral statements alluding
to comparative negligence do not merit a jury instruction on the theory. 3 70 The
the Bartlettdefense was appropriate
court also stated that an instruction concerning
371
it."
supports
evidence
"where
only
Bowman v. County of Los Alamos3 72 illustrates the application of this principle
where expert testimony is not required but the defendant fails to present sufficient
evidence to allow the factfinder to lay off fault on an alleged tortfeasor. Bowman
fell because a grate that normally covered a ground-level window well was not in
place.37 3 The defendant was responsible for maintaining the grates, which were
removable to facilitate cleaning. 374 At trial, there was no testimony as to how or by
whom the grate had been removed, though the defendant presented hearsay
testimony that "occasionally kids.. .will take them off. ' 375 The factfinder allocated
one-third of the fault to the defendant's negligence and the remaining two-thirds to
form.

an "unknown person or persons.

376

The plaintiff appealed, asserting that it was

error for the factfinder to attribute two-thirds of the fault to unknown others. 377 The
court of appeals agreed.3 78 The court ruled that there was no evidence as to who
removed the grate and that hearsay testimony that children sometimes did so was
not sufficient to overcome testimony that the defendant's employees regularly
removed grates to clean the wells.379 Finding that, on the evidence presented,
"[d]efendant's employees had equal, or greater, access to the grates," the court
concluded that "[t]he record only provides conjecture as to the cause of the grate
removal' 380 and ruled that there was insufficient evidence that any non-party was
negligent.38 '
If the plaintiff amends the complaint to join the person whom the defendant
named as a Bartlett tortfeasor, the burden of proof issue becomes more
complicated. 382 The defendant, having initially raised the fault of that person as an
affirmative defense, has the burden of proof that the person's negligence was a
contributing cause of the plaintiff's injuries.383 The plaintiff, by joining the person
as a co-defendant, takes on the burden of proving the same thing-that the person's
negligence contributed to the plaintiffs injuries. 384 Both parties now bear the
burden of proof as to the other person's fault. Whatever theoretical problems this
may raise, there is one practical proposition: the plaintiff and the defendant should
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. 18, 966 P.2d at 796.
Id. 10, 966 P.2d at 794.
Id. 111, 966 P.2d at 795.
102 N.M. 660, 699 P.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 661,699 P.2d at 134.
Id.
Id. at 662, 699 P.2d at 135.
Id. at 661, 699 P.2d at 134.
Id. at 662, 699 P.2d at 135.
Id. at 662-63, 699 P.2d at 135-36.
ld. at 662, 699 P.2d at 135.
Id. at 662-63, 699 P.2d at 135-36.
Id. at 663, 699 P.2d at 136.
The problem described here also arises when the plaintiff initially sues both defendants.
UJI 13-302D NMRA.
See Pack v. Read, 77 N.M. 76,419 P.2d 453 (1966); UJI 13-302B NMRA.
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both lose or both win their respective claims that the person was negligent and a
contributing cause. It would be illogical for a court to grant a summary judgment
to the new defendant, dismissing the plaintiff's claim against it, and then allow the
original defendant to lay off fault on the added defendant at trial. So too, if the
plaintiff succeeds in establishing the new defendant's potential liability, the original
defendant should not be precluded from laying off fault on the new defendant.
To assure symmetry of results, parallel procedural devices should be utilized. If
the new defendant moves for summary judgment against the plaintiff, the plaintiff
should file motions to strike and to obtain a partial summary judgment dismissing
the original defendant's affirmative defense asserting the Bartlett defense as to the
new defendant. 8 5 Similarly, if the plaintiff moves to strike the Bartlettdefense from
the original defendant's answer, the new defendant should file a motion seeking
summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim against the new defendant.
The motions should be consolidated for hearing at the same time, and the court
should consider all the evidence concerning the alleged fault of a defendant,
whether presented by the plaintiff or by any defendant, before ruling. In Skeet v.
Wilson,386 for example, the court stated that "a defendant may take advantage of
plaintiffs testimony if the defense is established thereby. 387 In like manner, a
plaintiff and one defendant should be able to take advantage of each other's
evidence to defeat or support a claim asserting that another defendant was at fault.
IV. CONCLUSION
Significant changes in substantive law inevitably affect procedure. Even as it
adopted comparative negligence and several liability, the New Mexico Supreme
Court recognized the need to reconsider the operation of the rules of procedure in
order to adapt the litigation process to the new substantive doctrines. The court
wisely chose to deal with procedural problems as they arose rather than through a
wholesale modification of the rules of civil procedure. The process has been a slow
one and is not yet complete, but the contours of pretrial practice have undergone
needed change and will continue to do so.
The core issue in pretrial practice is the proper means for raising the issue of the
fault of others. It is now time to reconsider the need for three alternatives and to
decide whether Rule 1-019 is the preferred method for raising the Bartlettdefense.
The courts also have gained sufficient experience in default judgment practice to
return to the fundamental procedural practices that already exist in Rule 1-055.
Finally, the courts must sort out issues of pleading and burdens of persusasion while
assuring that consistent results are reached when an alleged tortfeasor seeks to
escape liability by a pretrial motion to dismiss the complaint or for summary
judgment.

385. See discussion supra notes 357-366 and accompanying text.
386. 76 N.M. 697, 417 P.2d 889 (1966).
387. Id. at 701, 417 P.2d at 891; see Jaramillo, 1998-NMCA-142,1 15, 966 P.2d at 795.

